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The 1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment is the twelfth such annual 
report. It has been compiled by the Unit for Relations with the United States of America of 
the Directorate General for External Relations: Commercial Policy and Relations with North 
America, the Far East, Australia and  New Zealand on  the basis of material available to  the 
services of the European Commission.  Its  aim is to  provide an  inventory of obstacles that 
European exporters and investors encounter in the US. 
EU-US relations entered an important new phase with the adoption, at the EU-US Summit of 
December last year, of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and accompanying EU-US Joint 
Action Plan.  This year's "Barriers Report" must therefore be seen against the background of 
the joint commitment,  in  the  NT  A,  not  only to  strengthen  and  consolidate the multilateral 
trading system, but also to create a New Transatlantic Marketplace, by progressively reducing 
or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital between the EU and 
the  US.  As  part  of this  latter  initiative  there  will  be  a joint EU-US  study  on  ways  of 
facilitating trade and of reducing or eliminating such barriers.  It is expected that the present 
Report will play a useful role in this exercise. 
The  "Barriers  Report"  also  has  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of a  Transatlantic  economic 
relationship  which  has  grown  particularly  strongly  over  the  years,  to  the  benefit  of both 
economies, and which is underpinned by the most important trade and investment links in the 
world. 
The fact remains, however, that a considerable number of impediments, ranging from  more 
traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers, to differences in  the legal and regulatory systems, or 
due  to  the  absence  of internationally  agreed  rules  and  disciplines  in  new  areas,  such  as 
investment and competition policy, still need to be tackled.  The Commission remains firmly 
committed to addressing these through the appropriate channels (multilateral, plurilateral and 
bilateral) in  particular since the reinforcement of efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and 
disputes is essential to the confidence-building process which is an integral part of the NT  A. 
As regards the WTO, which has been in existence for over a year, the focus is now very much 
on  full  implementation  of the  Uruguay Round  agreements  and  on  ensuring  completion  of 
unfinished business. 
It is to be hoped that, as a means of identifying problems of access to and of operating in US 
markets, the European  Commission  services'  Report  will  continue to  play a useful  role  in 
focusing dialogue and negotiations, both  multilateral and bilateral, on the elimination of the 
obstacles inhibiting the free flow of trade and investment. 
The Report has taken into account developments until the beginning of May 1996. Extraterritoriality 
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Summary 
The EU strongly opposes the extraterritorial provisions of certain US  legislation which 
hamper international trade and investment by seeking to  regulate EU trade with third 
countries conducted by companies outside the US.  Particular problems are raised at the 
present time with regard to US legislative initiatives concerning Cuba, Iran and Libya. 
Unilateralism in  US  trade legislation  is  a major concern. The use of such  legislation 
undermines the internationally-agreed system of trade rules embodied in the WTO. This 
is  truer than ever following  the extension of WTO disciplines to new fields,  such  as 
services and intellectual property. 
Although the principle of national security has a long tradition in  trade policy, the EU 
has repeatedly expressed· concern about its excessive use by the US as a disguised form 
of protectionism, particularly in  relation to the application of import, procurement and 
investment restrictions, as well as the extraterritorial application of export restrictions. 
Even  before  the  Uruguay  Round  had  been  ratified,  the  EU  and  US  had  concluded 
negotiations  on  a  further  bilateral  procurement  agreement  that  improves  on  the 
provisions of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.  These two agreements 
increase substantially the  bidding opportunities for the  two  sides.  However,  the EU 
remains concerned about the wide variety of "Buy America" provisions which persist, 
and to which are being added others for federally funded infrastructure programmes. 
Tariffs have been substantially reduced in  successive GATT rounds.  As a result,  the 
EU's concern is focused on a relatively limited number of US  'peak' tariffs, where less 
progress has  been  made.  Beyond this,  EU exports also  face  a number of additional 
customs  impediments,  which  add  to  costs  in  a  similar  way  to  tariffs  such  as  the 
Merchandise Processing Fee and  the excessive  invoicing  requirements  on  importers. 
The EU is working with the US to try to alleviate some of these difficulties. 
EU  exporters  continue  to  face  a  number  of behind-the-border  impediments.  The 
proliferation  of regulation  at  State  level  presents  particular  problems  for  companies 
without offices in the US.  In addition, some federal standards differ from international 
norms meaning that manufacturers cannot directly export to  the US  products made to 
EU standards (normally based on international ones).  Other related difficulties concern 
labelling requirements and excessive reliance on  third-party certification.  Finally,  the 
FDA drug approval procedures continue to give non-US based firms difficulties. 
As  with  other  sectors,  the  implementation  of  Uruguay  Round  commitments  are 
changing  the  legislative  landscape  for  intellectual  property  rights.  Although  recent 
changes to patent law are welcome, some problems remain including that of informing 
right-holders of government use of patents. 
Concerns about federal tax measures focus on the nature of reporting requirements and 
the  specific  manner for  calculating  what is  due.  More  significantly,  however,  State 
"world-wide" unitary taxes are  inconsistent with  US  obligations under its  tax  treaties 
with third countries. 
Although  the  present Congress  does  not  appear to  be  threatening  the  same  kind  of 
widespread restrictions on national treatment as its predecessor, the EU is eager to work 
with the US to establish solid ground rules for the national treatment of investors, so as 
to  provide  a  framework  which  gives  businesses  real  confidence  when  they  invest 
abroad. 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round  has to some extent given  rise  to  an  easing of 
trade tensions in agriculture but a variety of issues remain unresolved and some others 
have re-emerged.  Certainly, US export subsidies should become less of a concern over 
the course of the six year Uruguay Round transition period.  Sanitary and phytosanitary 
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issues have therefore become the main  source of difficulty for the EU.  There is  also 
concern about the abuse of  ~eographic designations for wines. 
Little progress in the fisheries sector can be reported since last year.  EU concerns focus 
on US unilateral determinations concerning other countries' fishing practices. 
The  conclusion  in  the  OECD  of a  Shipbuilding  Agreement  in  December  1994  is 
anticipated to go a long way towards regulating unfair practices in this industry.  While 
the EU expects that the US will ratify the Agreement soon, it remains concerned about a 
number of US subsidies and tax policies. 
The  EU  remains  concerned  about  the  level  of  implicit  subsidies  to  US  aircraft 
manufacturers.  This is clearly an area for multilateral action, and progress needs to be 
made on the Civil Aircraft Agreement which remains stalled in the WTO. 
With the entry into force of the WTO GATS disciplines, this sector is for the first time 
subject to multilateral trade rules.  Although there are no specific commitments as yet to 
reduce trade barriers the EU remains hopeful that the ongoing negotiations in the WTO 
context will  be  brought to  a successful completion by the  agreed deadline.  The US 
reluctance to table an offer so far is a matter of concern. 
In addition, there has been no progress on the elimination of requirements that cargoes 
generated by US Federal programmes be shipped on US-flagged ships, on the contrary, 
this requirement has been extended to cover Alaskan oil exports. 
There has  been no  progress over the  last year on  the issues of computer reservation 
systems and foreign ownership restrictions.  The Commission is also concerned by the 
recent enactment of the Hatch Amendment which amounts to  a breach of international 
rules. 
The US  financial services industry is  in  the throes of major reform, which will sweep 
away many of the inter-state banking restrictions to the benefit of US and non-US banks 
as  well as  their customers.  However, US  sectoral segmentation rules remain in  place 
and  effectively  block  the  establishment  of  globally  integrated  financial  services 
organisations.  This has consequences for EU firms making strategic business decisions 
for the single European market.  For example, link ups  between banks and insurance 
firms face difficulties if both parties have US subsidiaries. 
As regards activity in the WTO, the US  decision only to  make partial commitments in 
the context of the extended GATS negotiations - and to take broad MFN exemptions in 
respect of future business and activities - reduces the value of the liberalisation package 
secured in these negotiations. 
Professional services  The implementation of the GATS schedules for professional services should result in 
some improvement in market access. However, a number of problems, especially due to 
regulation  at  the  State  level,  still  remain  to  be  tackled  in  order  to  secure  a  more 
transparent and open access to the US. 
Information society  The EU  is  moving  rapidly  towards  a  largely  deregulated  market  without  ownership 
restrictions,  and  is  looking  to  the  on-going  - and  recently  prolonged  - GATS  Basic 
Telecommunications negotiations to  engage all  the leading  industrialised parties  in  a 
firm set of commitments on  market access respecting the MFN principle and national 
treatment. 
The  EU  remains  concerned  about  the  considerable  hurdles  that  the  US  legislation 
presents  for  non-US  firms  and  foreign-owned  firms  wishing  to  invest  in  radio 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  to  provide  mobile  and  satellite  services.  In 
addition, the Federal Communications Commission  (FCC) exercises a high degree of 
autonomy and discretion in regulating this sector, including reciprocity-based licensing 
procedures for foreign-owned firms. 
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The  NT  A  commits  the  EU  and  the  US  to  the  creating  of a  "New  Transatlantic 
Marketplace" by progressively reducing, or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of 
goods, services and capital across the Atlantic.  There is also a commitment to fostering 
an  active  and  vibrant  transatlantic  community  by  deepening  and  broadening 
commercial,  social,  cultural,  scientific  and  educational  ties.  The  following  specific 
initiatives are of particular relevance in the context of the present report: 
•  The negotiation of a Mutual Recognition Agreement covering various sectors. 
This  will  allow  certification  to  US  standards  by  EU  bodies,  and  vice  versa,  thus 
eliminating some of the considerable costs involved for manufacturers on either side of 
the Atlantic. 
•  Regulatory cooperation seeking to make regulators more aware of the trade and 
investment  consequences  of their  decisions  and  to  discourage  the  development  of 
divergent regulations.  The existing dialogues between  regulators should  play a more 
substantial  role  in  addressing  issues  which  might otherwise  become  the  source of a 
future trade dispute. 
•  The  negotiation  of a customs  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance  agreement 
which  is  expected  to  be  concluded  by  the  year's  end.  It will  cover,  inter  alia, 
simplification  of customs  procedures,  data  and  personnel  exchanges  and  increased 
investigative cooperation. 
•  The launching of negotiations for a science and technology agreement with  a 
view to broadening cooperation in this field. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  The New Transatlantic Agenda 
During 1995, a detailed review of transatlantic relations was carried out.  This led, at the 
EU-US Summit in  Madrid on 3 December 1995, to the adoption of the NTA and the 
accompanying Joint EU-US  Action  Plan.  These documents provide a  new  basis for 
transatlantic  relations  by moving  the  relationship from  one of consultation to  one of 
joint action.  Apart from  a whole range of commitments in  areas such as foreign  and 
security policy, international crime, drug trafficking, migration, environment and health 
as  well  as  with  regard  to  increasing  the  number  of  players  directly  involved  in 
transatlantic contacts  ("Building bridges across the Atlantic"), the documents contain 
notably  a  substantial  chapter  on  economic  and  trade  issues  ("Contributing  to  the 
expansion  of world  trade  and  closer economic  relations").  The economic  chapter  is 
divided in two sections, dealing with multilateral and bilateral issues respectively. 
In  agreeing the very substantive provisions of this  chapter, EU and  US  were able to 
draw  on  the  recommendations  of the  business  communities  on  both  sides  of the 
Atlantic,  through  the  auspices  of the  Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue  (TABD),  an 
initiative  of the  late  Secretary  of Commerce  Brown  together  with  Commissioners 
Brittan and  Bangemann.  These recommendations were adopted by a  meeting of top 
American  and  European  business leaders  in  Seville in  November  1995.  Since then, 
further  meetings  of the  TABD  Steering  Committee  have  taken  place  and  15  issue 
groups  have  been  set  up  to  develop  more  specific  recommendations  on  individual 
sectors and issues on which a report will be made to the EU-US Summit in June 1996. 
In  line with the recommendations of the TABD, the main focus of the NTA provisions 
relating  to  trade  and  economic  relations  is  on  strengthening  the  multilateral  trading 
system.  In  this  context  there  is  a  specific  commitment  to  work  together  in  the 
preparation of the WTO Singapore Ministerial meeting.  Other issues that are addressed 
here  are  for  example  the  Uruguay  Round's  unfinished  business  (where  both  sides 
commit themselves to work for the successful conclusion of the current negotiations in 
all services sectors by the agreed timetables); government procurement (where there is a 
commitment  to  promote  the  launching,  by  Ministers  in  Singapore,  of negotiations 
covering substantially all government procurement and WTO members); cooperation on 
the  new  trade  issues  (including  a  commitment  to  work  together  to  conclude  an 
ambitious Multilateral Agreement on Investment at the OECD and develop discussions 
of this issue at the WTO); launching a specific exercise with a view to concluding an 
Information Technology Agreement and exploring, in the perspective of the Singapore 
meeting,  possible  further  tariff  reductions  on  industrial  products  and  possible 
accelerations in the implementation of existing obligations. 
The bilateral section foresees the creation of the "New Transatlantic Marketplace" by 
progressively reducing or eliminating barriers to the flow of goods, services and capital 
between  the  EU  and  the  US.  Again  in  line  with  TABD  recommendations,  the 
Transatlantic  Marketplace  highlights  standards,  certification  and  regulatory  issues, 
calling  in  particular for cooperation  in  the international  standard setting process,  the 
conclusion  of  a  Mutual  Recognition  Agreement  for  testing  and  certification  and 
enhanced regulatory cooperation.  In  addition  it contains commitments for action  on 
government  procurement,  intellectual  property  rights,  veterinary  issues,  customs 
cooperation and a series of other issues.  Importantly also, the EU and the US will carry 
out  a  joint  study  on  "ways  of facilitating  trade  in  goods  and  services  and  further 
reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers". 
Working towards the full implementation of the commitments in the Action Plan as well 
as the recommendations of the Joint Study will be at the top of the EU-US agenda for 
the coming years (for more specific information on the state of play on some of the key 
initiatives  under  the  NTA  see  below,  chapter  4).  The  progressive  elimination  of 1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 
identified trade barriers will not only directly benefit EU-US trade, but is expected to be 
conducive to further multilateral trade liberalisation.  The joint study which will involve 
report·s  to  the next three EU-US  Summits, is  expected to  make recommendations for 
action as well as analysing the problems. 
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1.2.  The Economic Relationship 
Transatlantic  economic  relations  are  underpinned  by  the  most  important  trade  and 
investment links in the world.  Such links have grown particularly strongly over the last 
few  years,  to  the benefit of both economies.  Meanwhile,  the two  sides remain  each 
other's  most  important  source  and  destination  for  foreign  direct  investment.  This 
section briefly reviews the data on EU-US trade and investment and places it in a global 
context. 
Trade in goods (export and imports) between the European Union (excluding the three 
new Member States) and the US reached nearly 190 billion ECU in 1994, an increase of 
about 11% over the previous year.  After the EU registered a trade deficit with the US 
for three consecutive years from  1990 to  1992,  in  1993  and  1994 bilateral trade was 
almost in  equilibrium (surplus of 0.6 billion ECU and  2.5  billion ECU respectively). 
Complete EU trade data for 1995 are not yet available, but EU (12) data for the first 9 
months  indicate  a  slight EU  deficit  of about  3.3  billion  ECU  in  the  bilateral  trade 
balance. 
EU(12)- US TRADE IN GOODS: 1990-1995 
1991  1992  1993  1994  1994*  1995* 
lllil EU exports to US 
1:1 EU imports from US 
EiJ Balance 
Source: Eurostat- Comext database 
The US  is the EU's single largest trading partner, accounting for  17% to  18%  in  both 
total EU-imports and total EU-exports in  1994.  Likewise, the EU is one of the two top 
markets for the US, accounting for 21% of US exports and 18% of US imports in 1994. 
3 1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 
Trade in services 
Bn IOCU 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
-10 
1988 
The EU and the US are the world's most important traders.  The share of the EU in total 
world trade (excluding intra-EU trade) amounted to 20% in  1994; while, the share of 
the US amounted to 18.3%.  Taking only bilateral EU-US trade, it represents almost 7% 
of  total world trade.  This was only marginally less compared to US-Canada trade which 
was 7.4%.  Trade between US and Japan represented 5.5% of total world trade. 
Transatlantic trade in services is gaining importance both in absolute terms and relative 
to merchandise trade.  In  1988, EU-US trade in services accounted for 71.4 bn ECU or 
about 51  per cent of trade in goods.  By 1993, this figure had risen to 114.1 bn ECU or 
approximately 67 per cent of merchandise trade. 
EU(12)- US TRADE IN SERVICES: 1988-1993 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
~EU  exports to US 
[:lEU imports from US 
Ill Balance 
Source: Eurostat- Geographical Breakdown of  the Current Account EUR 12,  1984-1993 (1995). 
Investment flows  The  EU  and  US  have  by  far  the  world's  most  important  bilateral  investment 
relationship, and each is the other's largest investment partner. In  1993, which is the 
most recent year for which EU data is available, the strong, mutual links between the 
US and the EU were confirmed with the EU investing 10.2 billion ECU (accounting for 
47% of the total EU outward Foreign Direct Investment, FDI) in the US and the US 
investing 9 billion ECU in the EU (accounting for 43 % of the total EU inward FDI). 
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EU(12) FDI FLOWS ABROAD: 1990-1993 
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The  cumulated  flows  over the  period  1984-1993  shows  that  the  US  was  the  single 
largest contributor with 33% of the EU inflows.  Conversely in the same period almost 
60% of EU investment abroad  went to  the US.  The US  is  thus the most important 
source and destination of EU FDI. 
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Cuba 
2.  HORIZONTAL ISSUES 
2.1.  Extraterritoriality 
2.1.1.  Introduction 
Extraterritoriality  is  a  long-standing  and  growing  feature  of the  US  legal  system, 
including - but not limited  to  - the  fields  of environmental,  banking,  tax  and  export 
control law. While the EU may share some of the objectives underlying such laws, it 
opposes the extraterritorial application of domestic legislation as  a matter of principle, 
insofar as it purports to force persons present in - and companies incorporated in  - the 
EU to  follow  US  laws or policies outside the US.  In  particular the EU opposes the 
extraterritorial provisions of certain US legislation which hamper international trade and 
investment  by  seeking  to  regulate  EU  trade  with  third  countries  conducted  by 
companies outside the US. 
In  the last year the US  Congress has  adopted (Cuba) or has initiated the adoption of 
(Iran, Libya) extraterritorial sanction legislation that could have severe economic and 
political consequences.  The EU has expressed its opposition to the imposition of US 
foreign  policy  objectives  on  European  companies  in  the  strongest  possible  terms, 
reserving its right to address the conformity of the measures with the US' international 
obligations in the relevant international fora. 
In addition, many close trading partners of the US, such as Canada and certain Member 
States of the EU  are considering triggering domestic  legislation,  including "blocking 
statutes",  in  order  to  preclude  the  extraterritorial  application  of foreign  legislation 
within their territory.  Others are contemplating strengthening the existing legislation in 
order to have a more effective response to this kind of problem. 
2.1.2.  Illustrative cases 
On  5  March  1996  the  US  Congress  adopted  the  Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERTAD)  Act of 1996  (formerly  the  "Helms  Bill",  S  381  and  its 
companion HR 927, the "Burton Bill") and on 12 March 1996 President Clinton signed 
the bill  into  law.  This  is  the  latest  in  a  series  of legislative  initiatives  since the  US 
proclaimed  a trade embargo  against Cuba in  1962  (Section 620  (a)  of the  Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961; further reinforced by the Food Security Act of 1985 and the 
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992). 
Since the two bills were first tabled, in February 1995, the EU has forcefully expressed, 
through  a  number  of representations  and  demarches,  its  opposition  to  this  kind  of 
legislation - or any secondary boycott legislation having extraterritorial effects.  The EU 
has also stressed the potential incompatibility of the LIBERT  AD Act with WTO rules 
and  its negative impact on  bilateral EU-US relations.  Most recently on April 22 the 
Council of the EU adopted a Declaration concerning the US trade legislation on Cuba, 
as well as Iran and Libya, which reiterates its continued and strong opposition to these 
legislative initiatives.  On 3 May 1996 the EU and its Member States requested Article 
XXIII consultations with the US in the WTO concerning the LIBERT  AD Act. 
The following provisions of this Act are of particular concern: 
•  It reconfirms  the  trade  embargo  against  Cuba,  including  its  extraterritorial 
effects on subsidiaries of US companies, incorporated in the EC; 
•  It prevents  the  US  government,  any  US  national,  or any  permanent resident 
alien  from knowingly  lending  to  any  foreign  person,  any  US  national  or permanent 
resident alien in order to finance transactions involving confiscated US property; 
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•  It establishes an  annual report on all assistance to  and commerce with  Cuba. 
The report must include,  inter alia,  a list of companies  involved  in joint ventures,  a 
determination  of outstanding Cuban  foreign  debt and  a description  of steps  taken  to 
ensure Cuban goods are not re-exported from their trading partners to the US; 
•  It  states  that  the  essential  security  interests  of the  US  require  assurances, 
through a certification plan, that Cuban sugar does not enter the US.  If a certificate to 
this effect is not provided, access to the US sugar quota is denied; 
•  It creates a new right of action in US courts for US nationals against any person 
(natural  or  legal,  of whatever  nationality,  as  long  as  he  is  within  the  in  personam 
jurisdiction of the US  courts) who "traffics in confiscated property".  This means that 
anyone  who  is  involved  in  investing  in,  managing  of  or  otherwise  engaging  in 
commercial activity relating to property seized by the Cuban  government since  1959 
from US  nationals or former Cuban citizens (now US nationals) runs the risk of having 
to  pay  the  value  of that  property  (or even  four  times  the  value,  if they  continue  to 
"traffic" after having received notice of a claim from a US national); 
•  It vests  a new  right  in  the  US  authorities  to  exclude aliens  (whether natural 
persons  or  persons  who  are  corporate  officials  or  controlling  shareholders  of  a 
company, spouses and  minor children) who "traffic in  confiscated property" from the 
US, and to deny them a visa. 
The Commission is of the view that these measures are in part, actually or potentially, 
contrary to  US  obligations under the WTO Agreements,  in  particular the GA TI and 
GATS,  and  that they  raise serious questions about the scope of the  national  security 
exceptions  to  GA  TI and  GATS,  including  their  possible  abuse  in  relation  to  third 
countries·  and  their  nationals.  The  Commission  also  deems  that  some  of  the 
LIBERTAD  Act  provisions  are  inconsistent  with  various  rules  and  standards  of 
international law in so far as they unreasonably and exorbitantly extend US jurisdiction 
in regard to aliens. 
In March 1995 Senator D'Amato proposed legislation that envisaged a US trade ban on 
Iran and would impose various sanctions against foreign persons and foreign companies 
trading with Iran.  President Clinton subsequently issued an executive order to prevent 
any US  person from financing petroleum development projects in Iran and two months 
later (7 May 1995) signed an executive order banning all US exports and investments to 
Iran by US companies and their overseas subsidiaries. 
Following  the  discussion  on  Iran  at  the  EU-US  Madrid  Summit  and  the  joint  EU 
Presidency/Commission demarche in Washington on 7 December 1995 the US  Senate 
adopted  a  revised  version  of the  Iran  Oil  Sanctions  Act  of 1995  (S  1228)  on  20 
December that shifted the focus from trade restrictions for foreign companies to foreign 
investment (above 40 million  US$)  in  the  development of petroleum resources.  The 
revised legislation set forth a list of sanctions including denial of Export-Import Bank 
assistance,  export  sanctions  and  denial  of loans  by  US  financial  institutions  under 
specified conditions. In  a last minute action on  the floor,  the scope of the Senate bill 
was also expanded to include Libya. 
On January 23  a further joint EU Presidency/Commission demarche was conducted to 
reiterate the EU'  s objection - in view of the adopted Senate bill - to the extraterritorial 
application  of  pending  US  legislation  that  would  impose  sanctions  on  foreign 
companies  for  trade  with  - and  investment  in  - Iran  and  Libya.  This  action  was 
accompanied by letters to  key members of both chambers of the US  Congress.  This 
issue  was  also  taken  up  at  the  ongoing  negotiations  on  a  multilateral  agreement  on 
investment in the OECD as well as in a WTO General Council meeting. 
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A consolidated bill (HR 3107) is currently pending in the US House of Representatives. 
On  21  March  1996  the  House  Committee  on  International  Relations  unanimously 
approved HR 3107,  widening even  further  the  range and  scope of sanctions against 
foreign  companies.  In  addition  to  the  above-mentioned  sanctions  proposed  in  the 
Senate text,  the  House bill  adds  imports  and  procurement  sanctions.  The sanctions 
would apply also to Libya and  targets investment as  well  as trade  in  petroleum and 
natural gas related technology. 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) aims  at  protecting  marine 
mammals,  particularly  dolphins  by  progressively  reducing  the  acceptable  level  of 
dolphin mortality in US  tuna-fishing operations in  the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean 
and  providing for  sanctions  to  be taken  against other countries  which  fail  to  apply 
similar  standards  for  dolphin  protection.  "Primary"  embargoes  are  currently  being 
applied to imports of certain yellowfin tuna products from Mexico, Panama, Colombia, 
Vanuatu  and  Venezuela.  "Secondary"  embargoes  on  yellowfin  tuna  products  are 
imposed  on  imports  from  "intermediary  nations"  - namely,  countries  which  are 
exporting to  the USA and have failed to certify that they have not imported from the 
primary embargoed countries during the preceding six months.  Costa Rica, Japan and 
Italy are currently subject to such a secondary embargo. 
Mexico, as a primary-embargoed country, requested a GATT Panel in November 1990. 
The  Panel  concluded  that  the  US  primary  and  secondary  embargoes  were  not  in 
conformity  with  GATT Article XI (Elimination  of Quantitative  Restrictions)  but the 
Panel's report was never adopted.  Subsequently the EU requested the establishment of 
a  further  GATT  Panel  in  February  1993  which  found  against  the  US'  unilateral 
measures  imposed  for  environmental  reasons  and  it  reiterated  that  trade  measures 
cannot be imposed with a view to forcing other countries to change their environmental 
and conservation policies within their own jurisdiction.  Again, this Panel's report was 
not adopted. 
The EU is carefully monitoring the progress of the current legislative initiatives before 
Congress which  may improve the situation  in  that they can  allow the embargo to  be 
lifted in return for certain undertakings from the nations subject to the primary embargo. 
Further examples  of extraterritorial  application  are to  be  found  in  the  US  Export 
Administration  Regulations  (EAR),  whose  legislative  authority  was  the  Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended.  Though scheduled to expire in  1990, 
the system of controls established continues in force based on a Presidential decision 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).  The 
EAR,  among  other  things,  require  companies  incorporated  and  operating  in  EU 
Member States to comply with US  re-export controls.  This includes compliance with 
US  prohibitions on  re-exports for reasons of US  national security and foreign policy. 
The extraterritorial nature of these controls has repeatedly been criticised by the EU and 
its Member States. 
Serious concerns have also  been  raised by  the  1988 US  Trade Act's amendment to 
Section ll of the EAA providing for sanctions against foreign companies which have 
violated their own countries' national export controls, if such violations are determined 
by the President to have had a detrimental effect on US national security.  The possible 
sanctions consist of a prohibition of contracting or procurement by US entities and the 
banning  of imports  of all  products  manufactured  by  the  foreign  violator.  These 
sanctions are of such a nature that they must be deemed contrary to the WTO and its 
Government J;>rocurement Code. 
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2.2.  Unilateralism in US trade legislation 
2.2.1.  Introduction 
Unilateralism in  US  trade  legislation  takes the form  of either unilateral  sanctions  or 
retaliatory measures against "offending" countries, or natural or legal persons.  These 
measures  are  unilateral  in  the  sense  that  they  are  based  on  an  exclusively  US 
appreciation of the trade  related behaviour of a foreign  country or its legislation  and 
administrative  practice,  without  reference  to,  and  sometimes  in  defiance  of,  agreed 
multilateral rules. 
US unilateralism undermines the global trading system in that it demonstrates a limited 
confidence  in,  and  discontent  with,  multilateral  rules  and  the  multilateral  dispute 
settlement  process,  and  runs  a  risk  that  the  affected  countries  will  adopt 
countermeasures. 
While the European Commission clearly remains concerned about unilateral provisions 
in US  legislation, it considers that with the entry into force of the WTO their practical 
application should be significantly reduced. 
The US  - like other WTO members - is  now bound under international law "to ensure 
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations 
as  provided  in  the  [Uruguay  Round]  Agreements"  (Art.  XVI  of  the  Agreement 
establishing the WTO).  Among those  obligations,  Art.  23  of the  Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the  Settlement of Disputes is of special importance. 
WTO  members  are from  now  on  precluded from  making  any determination  on  their 
own  that  a violation  of the  agreements  covered  (i.e.  the  GATT,  GATS,  TRIPs)  has 
occurred,  that benefits  have  been  nullified or impaired  or that  the  attainment of any 
objective of these agreements has been impeded.  Rather, WTO members have recourse 
to  the  reinforced  dispute  settlement system and  any determination  of the  above kind 
needs to be made in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Understanding and 
the findings of the panel or Appellate Body.  WTO members are also bound as regards 
the time allowed to abide by a panel ruling and the level of possible retaliation. 
2.2.2.  The relevant legislation 
The "section 30 I" family of legislation provides the most striking example of unilateral 
trade  legislation  and  their  future· application  will  therefore  be  watched  particularly 
closely by the EU.  Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act as amended by the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1986 authorises the US Administration to take action 
to  enforce  US  rights  under  any  trade  agreement  and  to  combat  those  practices  by 
foreign  governments  which  the  US  government  deems  to  be  discriminatory  or 
unjustifiable and to  bur<;~en or restrict US commerce. 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also introduced the so-called 
"Super 301 ".  "Super 301" is the name given to a special initiation procedure for unfair 
foreign  trade practice investigations following  the  Section  301  procedure.  Originally 
limited  to  1989  and  1990,  President  Clinton  issued  an  Executive  Order  on 
Identification of Trade Expansion Priorities on  3  March  1994.  Referring  to  the 
lapsed Super 301  provision, the Executive Order requires the US Trade Representative, 
on the basis of the information contained in the annual National Trade Estimates Report 
to  identify "priority"  unfair trade  practices  from  "priority"  countries  and  self-initiate 
Section 301  cases against them.  On  27  September 1995, the President amended such 
Executive Order to extend it to calendar years 1996 and 1997. 
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act furthermore introduced a -"Special 
301" procedure targeting intellectual property rights protection outside the US.  Under 
Special 301  the USTR identifies "priority" foreign countries that are deemed to  deny 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights and officially initiates 
investigation procedures which may eventually result in unilateral trade measures. 
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The US has initiated Section 301  procedures against the EU in  29 cases altogether.  In 
at  least  8  cases,  the  US  threatened  the  imposition  of punitive  duties  or  counter-
subsidies, or eventually resorted to such unilateral retaliation against the EU. 
2.2.3.  Hormones 
In  1989 in  response to a Community ban on the use of hormones in the production of 
livestock,  the  US  imposed  Section  301  unilateral  retaliation  measures  amounting  to 
100% ad  valorem duties on a range of EU exports to the value of $97.2 million.  This 
amount represents the US's perceived loss of trade to the EU in beef and beef products 
for human consumption and affects, among other products, canned tomatoes and fruit 
juice. 
In an effort to de-escalate the dispute later that year, the EU-US Hormones Task Force 
agreed "to lift retaliation on EC products to the extent that US  meat exports to the EC 
resumed".  In fact, two small reductions amounting to $4.5 million were made in  1989 
on this basis. 
Since then US exports of beef and beef products to the EU have risen steadily, to $34.3 
million in  1994.  The EU has therefore repeatedly requested that a further reduction in 
the  retaliation  measures  be  made.  The  US  has  maintained,  having  examined  the 
relevant trade data, that no such adjustment is warranted.  Although the issue has been 
raised on numerous occasions, and in particular during the final phase of the Uruguay 
Round  negotiations,  the  US  Administration  is  currently  not  prepared  to  give  a 
commitment to reduce the retaliation.  The US retaliation measures remain in force even 
though the US has now finally requested the establishment of a panel in the WTO.  In 
April  1996 the Community requested WTO consultations  with  the  US  regarding  the 
retaliation measures. 
2.2.4.  Procurement sanctions 
The EU and certain Member States also continue to be subject to sanctions under Title 
VII of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.  The sanctions bar EU 
suppliers from bidding, inter alia, for US  federal government contracts that are below 
the threshold  values of the WTO Agreement on  Government Procurement.  The US 
imposed these sanctions in  1993 after bilateral negotiations failed to lead to agreement 
on  liberalising  purchases  of telecommunications  equipment  on  both  sides  of the 
Atlantic.  The EU responded with counter-sanctions (Regulation 1461193) that also bar 
US bidders from applying for contracts awarded by central government agencies below 
the  threshold  values.  Following  the  bilateral  Marrakech  procurement  agreement  of 
April1994, which liberalised around $100 billion of procurement opportunities on both 
sides, the EU considers that the sanctions are an unnecessary impediment to the bilateral 
relationship, and is urging a reciprocal lifting of sanctions. 
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2.3.  Impediments through national security considerations 
2.3.1.  Introduction 
The right of sovereign nations to take any measure to  protect their essential national 
security  interests  has  been  widely  recognised  by  multilateral  and  bilateral  trade 
agreements.  However, it is in the interest of all trade partners that such measures are 
prudently  and  sparingly applied,  as  for  example  manifested  by  the  OECD  National 
Treatment Instrument and Codes of Liberalisation.  Restrictions to trade and investment 
cannot  be  justified  on  national  security  grounds  if they  are,  in  reality,  essentially 
protectionist in nature and serve other purposes than the protection of security interests. 
This latter concern is  particularly appropriate in  the case of the US  which  generally 
regards its national security as interwoven with domestic economic strength. 
US legislation includes numerous restrictions on foreign imports, exports, procurement 
and  investment  which  are  justified  ~n national  security  considerations.  The  EU 
continues to  have major concerns about the overuse of these provisions and the US' 
apparent  undermining  of international  agreements  designed  to  alleviate  some of the 
restrictions.  The EU is  carefully  monitoring  US  implementation  of the  new WTO 
procurement rules, and is  addressing some of the matters raised in  this chapter in  the 
negotiations on investment issues. 
2.3.2.  Import restrictions 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, US industry can petition for 
the  restriction  of imports  from  third  countries  on  the  grounds  of national  security. 
Protective measures can be used for an unlimited period of time.  The Department of 
Commerce investigates the effects of imports which threaten to impair national security 
either by quantity  or by  circumstances.  Section  232  is  supposed  to  safeguard  US 
national  security,  not  the  economic  welfare  of  any  company,  except  when  that 
company's future may affect US  national security.  The application of Section 232 is 
not dependent on proof of injury to US industry. 
In the past, the EU has voiced its concern that Section 232 gives US manufacturers an 
opportunity to seek protection on grounds of national security, when in reality the aim is 
simply to curb foreign competition.  The EU will continue to monitor closely the impact 
of these restrictions 
2.3.3.  Export restrictions 
A  comprehensive  system  of  export  controls  was  established,  under  the  Export 
Administration  Act  of 1979,  and  continued  under  the  International  Economic 
Emergency Powers Act of 1977 to prevent trade to unauthorised destinations.  This 
system is also used to enforce US foreign policy decisions and international agreements 
on non-proliferation of certain types of goods or know-how.  The EU has repeatedly 
expressed its concern about the unilateral determination by the US  concerning export 
licences  for  products  made  in  the  EU:  this  creates  a  conflict  of jurisdictions  and 
requirements for European companies whenever their products or exports have had  a 
component or an  element controlled under US  export control regimes.  One particular 
element is the US policy to consider a subsidiary of a US company incorporated in one 
of the Member States of the EU as a US company and as such subject to US jurisdiction 
for actions within the EU (cf. under "Export Controls", chapter 2.1.2.). 
The  EU  Member  States  cooperate  with  the  US  in  various  "non-proliferation" 
agreements, ·'such  as  on  nuclear,  chemical  and  biological  warfare,  and  missile 
technology.  Both  sides  are  also  working  together to  establish  the  new  multilateral 
arrangement for export controls - the New Forum - to respond to threats caused by the 
proliferation  of  sensitive  dual  use  items,  as  well  as  of  arms  and  arms-related 
technologies. 
11 1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 
Reduced scope of 
GPA 
More clarity on GPA 
Buy America 
restrictions 
MOU's undermined 
Restrictions are 
counter-productive 
2.3.4.  Procurement restrictions 
Although the concept of national security can be invoked under Article XXill of the 
WTO Government Procurement Agreement  (GPA)  to  limit  national treatment  in  the 
defence sector for foreign suppliers, the use of national security considerations by the 
US  has  led  in  practice to  a disproportionate reduction  in  the  scope of DoD  supplies 
covered by the GPA. 
While the US denies abusing the WTO national security exemption, it has indicated a 
readiness,  in  the  context  of the  implementation  of the  GPA,  to  disseminate  more 
guidance to US  procurement officials for identifying which procurements are covered 
by the Agreement and which by national security exemptions.  It has also expressed its 
intention to ensure clear and consistent identification of national security procurements, 
and  improve the coherence of the US  Federal Supply Classification System with  the 
international Harmonised System.  Together, these mark a first small step towards more 
acceptable practices. 
The  concept  of  "national  security"  was  originally  used  in  the  1941  Defence 
Appropriation Act to restrict procurement by the DoD to US sourcing.  Now known as 
the Berry Amendment, its  scope has been extended to  secure protection for a  wide 
range of products only tangentially related to national security concerns - for example, 
the General Accounting Office 1992 ruling that the purchase of fuel cells for helicopters 
is  subject to the Berry Amendment fibre content provisions, and the withdrawal of a 
contract to supply oil containment booms to the US  Navy because of the same textile 
restrictions. 
Although the Berry Amendment does provide for waivers from its strict requirements, it 
is not clear whether the DoD actually makes use of these possibilities. 
Further DoD procurement restrictions are based on the National Security Act of 1947 
and the Defence Production Act of 1950, which grant authority to impose restrictions 
on foreign supplies in order to preserve the domestic mobilisation base and the overall 
preparedness posture of the US. 
At the  same  time,  defence  procurement  from  foreign  companies  is  sometimes  also 
impeded  by  Buy  America  restrictions  on  federally  funded  programmes  (see  section 
2.4.4.).  US  Allies including eleven EU member states have concluded Cooperative 
Industrial  Defence  Agreements  or  Reciprocal  Procurement  Agreements 
(Memorandums of Understanding, MOUs) with the US.  These agreements provide for 
a waiver  by  the  Secretary of Defence of the price differentials  under Buy America 
restrictions with respect to  goods produced by the Allies.  They aim to promote more 
efficient cooperation  in  research,  development and  production  of defence equipment 
and achieve greater rationalisation, standardisation, and compatibility. 
However,  US  legislation  allows  the  Administration  (DoD  and  USTR)  to  rescind  a 
waiver if it determines  that a  particular Ally  discriminates  against US  products.  In 
addition,  Congress  is  unilaterally  overriding  the  MOUs  by  imposing  ad  hoc  Buy 
America requirements during the annual budget process.  According to EU industrial 
sources, there are also indications that US procurement officers disregard the exemption 
of Buy America restrictions for MOU countries, e.g.  in the case of fuel-cells, ball and 
roller bearings and steel forging items. 
A  1989 DoD  Report to  Congress casts  doubt on  whether  many  of the  procurement 
restrictions contribute towards the aim of maintaining an  essential US  industrial base. 
The main arguments against procurement restrictions are that they: 
•  increase by 30 to 50% the price of DoD requirements; 
•  are a disincentive for investment and innovation; 
•  are costly in terms of paperwork and management; 
12 Reinforcing Exon-
Florio 
OECD efforts in 
question 
Uncertainties about 
implementation 
Foreign ownership 
restrictions 
1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 
•  have produced increased lead-times for supply by domestic industries; 
•  maintain a climate of protectionism; 
•  create an atmosphere of animosity with allies, particularly when they violate 
the spirit of the MOUs. 
2.3.5.  Investment restrictions 
Section  5021  of  the  1988  Trade  Act,  the  so..:called  Exon-Fiorio  amendment, 
authorises the President to investigate the effects on US national security of any merger, 
acquisition or take-over which could result in foreign control of legal persons engaged 
in  interstate  commerce.  This  screening  is  carried  out  by  the  Treasury-chaired 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS).  The length of time taken by the 
screening  process  and  the  legal  costs  involved  can  act  as  a  deterrent  to  foreign 
investment. Moreover, should the President decide that any such transactions threaten 
national security,  he can take action  to  suspend or prohibit these transactions.  This 
could  include the forced  divestment of assets.  There are  no  provisions for judicial 
review or for compensation in the case of divestment. 
Since being introduced, the scope of Exon-Florio has been further enlarged: 
•  Since 1992, an Exon-Florio investigation must be made if a foreign government 
owned entity engages in any merger, acquisition or take-over which gives it control of 
the company.  Further provisions contain a declaration of policy aimed at discouraging 
acquisitions by and the award of certain contracts to such entities. 
•  The Fiscal  Year 1993 Defence Authorisation Act requires  a  report  by  the 
President to  Congress on  the results of each CFIUS  investigation and  by including, 
among other factors to be considered,  "the potential effect of  the proposed or pending 
transaction  on  US's  international  technological  leadership  in  areas  affecting  US 
national security"  - again  blurring  the  line  between  industrial  and national  security 
policy. 
The Exon-Florio provisions inhibit the efforts of OECD members to improve the free 
flow of foreign investment and could conflict with the principles of the OECD Code of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movements. 
While the EU understands the wish of the US to take all necessary steps to safeguard its 
national security, there is continued concern that the scope of application may be carried 
beyond what is  necessary to protect essential security interests.  In this context, the EU 
has drawn attention to the lack of a definition of national security and the uncertainty as 
to  which  transactions  are  notifiable.  Although  the  US  Treasury's  implementing 
regulations,  which  were  published  in  November  1991,  did  provide  some  additional 
guidance  on  certain  issues,  many  uncertainties  remain.  Coupled  with  the  fear  of 
potential forced  divestiture,  many,  if not most,  foreign  investors have felt  obliged to 
give  prior  notification  of their  proposed  investments.  In  effect,  a  very  significant 
number of EU firms' acquisitions in the US are subject to pre-screening. 
With  regard  to  foreign  ownership,  the US  has  informed the OECD of a  number of 
additional restrictions which it justifies "partly or wholly" on the grounds of national 
security.  Foreign investment is  restricted in coastal and domestic shipping under the 
Jones Act (see section 3.4.2) and the US Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which 
includes fishing, dredging, salvaging or supply transport from a point in the US to an 
offshore drilling rig or platform on the Continental Shelf.  Foreign investors must form 
a US subsidiary for exploitation of deep water ports and for fishing in  the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Anti-reflagging Act of 1987). 
Licences  for  cable  landings  are  only  granted  to  applicants  in  partnership  with  US 
entities (on the Submarine Cable Landing Licence Act of 1921, see section 3.8.2.). 
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Under the Federal Power Act, any construction, operation or maintenance of facilities 
for  the  development,  transmission  and  utilisation  of power  on  land  and  water  over 
which  the  Federal Government has control are to  be licensed by  the  Federal Energy 
Regulatory  Commission.  Such  licenses  can  only  be  granted  to  US  citizens  and  to 
corporations organised under the laws of the United States.  The same applies under the 
Geothermal  Steam  Act  to  leases  for  the  development  of geothermal  steam  and 
associated  resources  on  lands  administered  by  the  Secretary  of the  Interior  or  the 
Department of Agriculture.  As  regards  the  operation,  transfer,  receipt,  manufacture, 
production, acquisition and import or export of facilities which produce or use nuclear 
materials,  the  Nuclear Energy Act requires that  a licence be issued  but the  licence 
cannot be  granted to  a foreign  individual or a foreign-controlled  corporation,  even if 
there is incorporation under US law. 
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2.4.  Public Procurement 
2.4.1.  Introduction 
In  April 1994, the EU and US  finalised a further round of bilateral negotiations.  The 
new agreement, building on the 1993 Memorandum of Understanding, was - in essence 
- fully  integrated into the WTO  Government Procurement Agreement,  which entered 
into force on  1 January 1996.  The 1994 agreement expands coverage to include some 
sub-central government agencies, electricity utilities, ports and airports.  However, US 
sub-federal coverage is still incomplete (only 39 of the 50 States, and 7 of the 24 largest 
US cities are covered), and the EU has therefore scaled back its offer to match. 
Although this agreement reduces the number of "Buy America" restrictions, EU firms 
still  face  substantial  difficulties  when  tendering  in  the  US.  A  number  of federally 
funded  programmes  still  contain  "Buy  America"  restrictions  which  limit  export 
opportunities  from  EU  firms.  Set  aside  provisions  for  US  small  businesses  also 
constitute a significant barrier for EU companies in  the  US  government procurement 
market. 
The EU is  now looking to the new multilateral and bilateral agreements to expand the 
level of opportunities for EU suppliers and  contractors.  The EU will closely monitor 
US implementation of these agreements. 
Furthermore, as  part of the Joint EU-US Action Plan, the EU and US  have agreed to 
discuss  all  outstanding  bilateral  issues  on  government  procurement.  Clearly,  whilst 
welcoming progress already made on the US  side to open its government procurement 
markets, the EU expects further improvements in the areas outlined below to be made in 
the context of the transatlantic dialogue. 
2.4.2.  Federal "Buy America" legislation 
The Buy America Act of 1933, as amended, contains the basic principles of a general 
buy national policy.  It covers a number of discriminatory measures, generally termed 
"Buy America" restrictions, which apply to government-funded purchases.  These take 
several forms:  some prohibit public sector bodies from purchasing goods and services 
from foreign  sources.  Others  establish  local content requirements,  while  others  still 
extend  preferential  price  terms  to  domestic  suppliers.  "Buy  America"  restrictions 
therefore  not  only  directly  reduce  the  opportunities  for  European  exports,  but  also 
discourage US bidders from using European products or services. 
The restrictions  apply  to  government  supply  and  construction  contracts,  and  require 
Federal agencies to  procure only US  mined or produced unprocessed goods,  and only 
manufactured  goods  with  at  least  a 50%  local  content.  Executive Order 10582 of 
1954,  as  amended,  expands  the  scope  of the  Buy  America  Act  in  order  to  allow 
procuring entities to set aside procurement for small businesses (see section 2.4.6.) and 
firms  in  labour surplus areas, and to  reject foreign  bids either for  national interest or 
national security reasons. 
Similar restrictions to those in the Buy America Act are contained in: 
•  the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defence Production Act of 1950 (see 
section 2.3.4); 
•  the Department of Defence Balance of Payments Program, which provides 
for a 50% price correction on foreign offers, when compared with US offers; 
•  the  Competition in  Contracting Act of 1984,  which  allows  the  procuring 
agencies to restrict procurement, on a case by case basis, in order to achieve industrial 
mobilisation objectives. 
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•  the  National  Space  Policy  Directive of 1990,  which  establishes  that  US 
Government satellites  will  be  launched solely on  US  manufactured  launch  vehicles, 
unless a specific exemption has been granted by the President.  The measure is part of a 
set  of  coordinated  actions  to  strengthen  the  US  launch  industry  and  is  clearly 
detrimental  to  European  launch  service  providers.  European  launch  operators  are 
effectively barred from competing for US government launch contracts, which account 
for  approximately  80%  of the  US  satellite  market.  The restriction,  which  initially 
applied  to  the  launching  of military  satellites,  was  justified  by  the  US  on  national 
security grounds, but is now also imposed on satellites for civilian use. 
2.4.3.  Telecommunications sector 
The issue of procurement in the telecommunications sector remains unresolved between 
the EU and US.  US telecommunications companies have historically bought equipment 
from  local  suppliers, and AT&T buys network equipment almost exclusively from  its 
manufacturing arm, though this may change following the announced break-up of the 
company.  Furthermore,  "Buy  America"  rules  continue  to  apply  to  purchases  of 
telecoms  equipment  by  rural  telephone  co-operatives  financed  by  the  Rural 
Electrification Administration (see below). 
Not covered by WTO  Although the EU has  sought negotiated solutions to  these problems, neither the new 
GPA nor bilateral obligations cover this sector.  One of the principal difficulties is the 
criteria for establishing which particular utilities should be included.  The EU believes 
that coverage should not specifically distinguish between public and private companies, 
but  should  focus  on  the  underlying  conditions  which  lead  telecommunications 
companies  to  pursue  procurement  policies  that  tend  to  favour  particular  national 
suppliers.  These conditions include,  first,  insulation  from  market forces  through  the 
possession  of a  monopoly  or  a  dorrunant  position  over  a  network,  or  through  the 
possession of special rights relating to the management of the network; and, second, the 
means  which  government  may  use  to  influence the  operations of an  entity,  such  as 
regulation of tariffs and financing, or authorisation to operate.  Thus, the EU argues that 
both publicly owned and private status utilities operating under monopoly or dominant 
conditions should be covered - this would introduce a higher level of transparency and 
would lead to improved market access. 
Additional 
Congressional 
restrictions 
2.4.4.  Federal "Buy America"  funding programmes 
In  addition to  legislative restrictions,  the US  Congress regularly adopts  some ad  hoc 
Buy America provisions as  part of the  Budget Authorisations  and/or Appropriations 
legislation  that  apply  to  federally  funded  programmes.  These  typically  raise  price 
preferences from  a standard 6%. up to  10-25%, notably in  the  water,  transport (mass 
transit, airport and highway construction), energy, and telecommunications sectors.  By 
way of examples: 
•  The  Airport  and  Airway  Safety,  Capacity,  Noise  Improvement  and  Inter-
modal Transportation Act of 1993 includes  a  price  preference  and  local  content 
provisions for US  steel and manufactured products procured by the Federal Aviation 
Authority. 
•  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended by Section 39 of the Clean 
Water Act, provides for a 6% price preference for US suppliers for projects for water 
treatment. 
•  The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978 provides federal  assistance 
for State transport projects, as long as States impose US standards, include a 25% price 
preference for US equipment and require the use of US manufactured steel. 
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•  The Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency  Act of 1991  extends  the 
existing Buy America restrictions on steel to iron products and reserves at least 10% of 
the total appropriations for US small and disadvantaged businesses.  It also provides for 
trade sanctions against a foreign country which is considered to discriminate against US 
suppliers.  According to the EU steel industry, this legislation has a negative impact on 
trade  opportunities  with  respect  to  procurements  carried  out  by  the  Department  of 
Transportation. 
•  The Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978 and  successive legislation provides  that 
steel  products,  rolling  stock  and  power  train  equipment  be  purchased  from  US 
suppliers,  unless  US-made  items  cannot  be  purchased  and  delivered  in  the  United 
States within a reasonable time. 
•  The Rural Electrification Administration provides loans and  loan guarantees to 
telephone  and  electric  authorities,  subject to  all  the  materials  and  equipment  being 
domestically produced.  Following  ratification  of the  bilateral  Marrakech  agreement, 
"Buy American" restrictions will only apply to loans made to telephone utilities. 
•  The Clean Coal Technology Program, which  is  part of the Energy Policy Act 
requires  that projects  selected  by  the  Agency for  International  Development for  this 
programme  must  ensure  that  at  least  50%  of  the  equipment  supplied  must  be 
manufactured in the US. 
•  Defence Appropriation and Authorisation Acts (see section 2.3.4.). 
2.4.5.  State Buy America legislation and restrictions 
"Buy America" or "buy local" legislation is also rife at State level in the US.  Although 
39 of the 50 States are covered by  the bilateral agreement of 1994 (and 90% of total 
procurement by value at State level), there are still gaps in the scope of the agreement at 
State level.  Purchases of cars, coal and steel are exempted for many States. In the case 
of New Jersey, State legislation also provides that for the construction of public works 
projects financed by State funds, the materials used (e.g. cement), must be of domestic 
origin. 
2.4.6.  Set aside for Small Businesses 
The Small Business Act of 1953, as amended, requires executive agencies to place a 
fair  proportion  of  their  purchases  with  small  businesses.  These  are  defined  as 
businesses located in the United States which make a significant contribution to the US 
economy and are not dominant.  Currently, the concept of fair proportion means that the 
Government-wide goal for participation by small businesses shall be established at no 
less than 20% of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year.  Under 
the  normal  bid  procedures,  there  is  a  12%  preference  for  small  businesses  in  bid 
evaluation  for  civilian  agencies  (instead  of the  standard  6%).  In  the  case  of the 
Department  of Defence,  the  standard  50%  preference  applies  to  all  US  businesses 
offering a US product. 
An important number of States also operate particularly proactive small businesses and 
minority set-aside policies.  It is estimated that in States like California and Texas such 
policies effectively close off around 20% of procurement opportunities to foreign firms. 
In  Kentucky  as  much  as  70%  is  set  aside  for  small  businesses.  The  new  WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement will  not, at present, affect the operation of these 
set asides. 
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2.5.  Tariff Barriers and Equivalent Measures 
2.5.1.  The result of  the Uruguay Round negotiations on Market Access 
The  US  committed  itself  in  the  Uruguay  Round  to  an  average  tariff  reduction  on 
industrial products of 37%;  vis-a-vis the EU it went even  further and  will  reduce its 
tariffs by 46%.  The US commitment covers both the elimination and harmonisation of 
duties in certain sectors and  the reduction of certain tariff peaks (defined as tariffs of 
15% and higher).  Tariff reductions will be implemented over a period of 5-10 years, 
beginning on 1 January  1995.  Beyond this, total tariff elimination was negotiated on a 
plurilateral basis, among a number of industrial countries, in various sectors, including: 
beer and brown distilled spirits; some pharmaceutical products; paper, pulp and printed 
matter;  steel;  construction  and  agriculture  equipment;  medical  equipment;  toys  and 
furniture. 
A  number of US  tariff peaks  remain  in  various  sectors  including  textiles,  footwear, 
ceramics, glass and trucks.  Reductions in  the field of textiles,  where most peaks are 
maintained, will only average 12%.  The 25% duty on imports of trucks will remain in 
place. 
In the context of the NTA the EU and the US are committed to exploring the possibility 
of  agreeing  on  a  mutually  satisfactory  package  of tariffs  reductions  on  industrial 
products and to considering which, if any, Uruguay Round obligations on tariff can be 
implemented on an accelerated basis.  They are also committed to attempt to conclude 
an  information  technology  agreement  which  should,  inter  alia,  further  reduce  or 
eliminate tariffs in the information technology sector.  Moreover, bilateral trade should 
be facilitated  by the simplification in  customs procedures arising  out of the Customs 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreement which is under negotiation (see section 
4.3.). 
2.5.2.  Customs User Fees 
The  need  to  tackle  the  budget  deficit  without  increasing  taxes  has  led  to  the 
establishment of a series of User Fees by which only the user of a particular (formerly 
free) service pays an amount presumed to cover the cost of the service provided. 
As a result of laws enacted in 1985 and 1986, the US imposes user fees on the arrival of 
merchandise,  vessels,  trucks,  trains,  private  boats  and  planes,  as  well  as  passengers. 
The Customs and Trade Act of 1990 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990 extended  and  modified  these  provisions  by,  among  other things,  considerably 
increasing the level of the fees.  Excessive fees  levied for customs, harbour and other 
arrival facilities, that is for facilities mainly used by importers, place foreign products at 
an unfair disadvantage vis-a-vis US competition. 
The most significant of the Customs User Fees (CUF) is the Merchandise Processing 
Fee (MPF).  The MPF is levied on all imported merchandise except for products from 
the  least  developed  countries,  from  eligible  countries  under  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Recovery Act and the Andean Trade Preference Act, and from US  insular possessions. 
It is  also levied on  merchandise entered under Schedule 8,  Special Classifications, of 
the Tariff Schedules of the US.  Fixed previously at 0.17% of the value of the imported 
goods, the MPF rose to  0.19%  in  1992 and  amounts to 0.21% ad  valorem on  formal 
entries with a maximum of $485 as from 1 January 1995.  Meant, when established, to 
last until 30 September 1990, it has been extended on  various occasions.  It now runs 
until 30 September 2003. 
At  the  request of Canada and  the  EU,  the  GATT Council  instituted  a  Panel  which 
concluded in November 1987 that the US CUF for merchandise processing were not in 
conformity with the General Agreement. The Panel ruled that a CUF was not in  itself 
illegal  but that  it  should  be  limited  in  amount  to  the  approximate  cost  of services 
rendered. The GATT Council adopted the panel report in February 1988. 
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The present Customs User Fees structure is somewhat more equitable, since the fixing 
of a ceiling makes it less onerous for high-value consignments.  However, the fee is still 
likely, in many cases, to exceed the cost of the service rendered since, irrespective of the 
level, it is still based on the value of the imported goods.  Moreover, if the most recent 
increase  was  essentially  designed  to  balance the shortfall  of customs  revenues  as  a 
consequence of the Uruguay Round duty rates reduction, the EU would be particularly 
concerned. 
2.5.3.  Harbour Maintenance Fee 
US Customs also participates in the collection of the Harbour Maintenance Fee (HMF). 
The HMF is levied in all US ports on waterborne imports, exports and domestic cargoes 
at  an  ad  valorem  rate  of 0.125%.  It  serves  to  fund  dredging  and  other  harbour 
maintenance  act1v1t1es.  However,  the  ad  valorem  basis  for  its  collection  makes  it 
difficult  to  justify as  a  fee  approximating  the  cost of the  service  provided.  While 
enforcement through  Customs ensures that  imported  merchandise  bears  the  fee,  the 
same is  not true for domestic cargo.  As a consequence, for instance,  1992 data show 
that imports bear 65% of the levy, exports 27% and domestic cargo 3%. 
Moreover, there is a notable accumulation of unused funds which is projected to rise to 
$1.66 billion by 1999.  According to US Authorities this is due to the absence of proper 
budgeting of dredging works or to the blockage of projects by environmental lobbying 
groups.  However, the European Commission is closely monitoring the accumulation of 
unused funds as this may point to the excessive nature of the fee. 
The  member countries  of the  Consultative  Shipping  Group  (which  includes  all  EC 
Member States with the exception of Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg) together with 
the Commission conducted a demarche on 18 March 1996 to the Department of State 
reiterating that the user fees for shipping should be related to the costs they are intended 
to cover while fees set in excess of that are not fees but taxes. 
The US Court of International Trade in a recent judgement found that the HMF is a tax 
and  not  a  user  fee  and  exempted  US  exports  from  it.  This  ruling  reinforces  the 
Community  view  that  the  fee  is  onerous  and  not  related  to  the  customs  services 
provided.  Since it no  longer applies to  US exports, it should not any more apply to 
imports.  Compatibility with GATT Art.  III now also arises. 
2.5.4.  Excessive invoicing requirements 
Invoice requirements for exporting certain products to the US can be excessive.  This is 
particularly the  case  for  textiles  and  clothing  where  customs formalities  require  the 
provision  of  particularly  detailed  and  voluminous  information.  Much  of  this 
information  would  appear to  be  irrelevant  for  customs  or  statistical  purposes.  For 
example, for garments with an outer shell of more than one construction or material, it 
is  necessary to  give the relative  weight,  percentage values  and  surface area of each 
component; for outer shell components which are blends of different materials, it is also 
necessary to include the relative weights of each component material. 
EU exporters of footwear and machinery are faced with the same type of complex and 
irrelevant questions (e.g.  a requirement to provide the names of the manufacturers of 
wood-working  machines,  and  of the  numerous  spare  parts).  Furthermore,  the  US 
Customs and customs house brokers can also request proprietary business information 
(e.g. listing of ingredients in perfumes or composition of chemicals). 
The  information  requirements  far  exceed  normal  customs  declaration  and  tariff 
procedures.  They are unnecessary because customs are entitled to ask for all necessary 
supplementary documents and information during clearance (standard 15  of Annex B 1 
of the  Kyoto  Convention).  There should be no  systematic  demand for this  kind  of 
information.  These  formalities  are  also  burdensome  and  costly,  thus  constituting  a 
barrier  against  new  entrants  and  small  companies.  As  a  result,  large  established 
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suppliers are privileged and small new competitors disadvantaged.  These effects are 
particularly disruptive in diversified high-value and small-quantity markets which are of 
special relevance for the EU. 
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2.6.  Technical  barriers  to  trade:  standardisation,  testing, 
labelling and certification 
2.6.1.  Introduction 
In  the US, products are  increasingly being required to conform to  multiple technical 
regulations  regarding  consumer  protection  (including  health  and  safety)  and 
environmental  protection.  Even  if,  in  general,  not  intentionally  discriminatory,  the 
complexity of US  regulatory systems can represent an  important structural impediment 
to  market  access.  For example,  it  is  not  uncommon  that equipment for  use  in  the 
workplace  be  subject  to  US  Labour  Department  certification,  a  county  authority's 
electrical  equipment  standards,  specific  regulations  imposed  by  large  municipalities, 
and other product safety requirements as determined by insurance companies. 
This situation is  aggravated by the lack of a clear distinction between essential safety 
regulations and  optional requirements for  quality,  which  is  due  in  part to  the role of 
some  private organisations as  providers of assessment and certification in  both  areas. 
Moreover,  for  products  where  national  standards  do  not  exist,  product  safety 
requirements can change overnight as  the product liability  insurance market makes  a 
new assessment of what will be required for insurance purposes. 
WTO TBT Agreement  In  the Uruguay Round  the US  has  agreed  on  an  expanded Agreement on  Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) which will improve the rules for enforcing standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures.  The TBT Agreement is applicable 
to  all  WTO  members,  but  provides  for  the  right  to  adopt  and  maintain  appropriate 
technical rules  for  specific, legitimate objectives, such  as  protection of human  health 
and safety, plant and  animal health, and  protection of the environment.  The level  of 
protection is discretionary as long as measures respect the basic provisions of the TBT 
Agreement.  A  feature  of the  new  TBT Agreement  is  the  proportionality  criterion 
which  is  intended  to  ensure  that  technical  regulations  and  conformity  assessment 
procedures are not more trade restrictive than required for the legitimate purpose of the 
regulations concerned and the risks they are designed to cover. 
Industrial fasteners 
The EU believes that the TBT provides an  excellent base on  which to tackle technical 
barriers to trade at the multilateral level.  In particular, it specifies stricter disciplines in 
many  of the  areas  of concern  discussed  below,  such  as  the  use  of  international 
standards,  labelling  requirements  and  sub-federal  standards.  The  Agreement  also 
provides for  further  bilateral follow-up  actions.  In  this  context,  the EU  and  US  are 
negotiating a Mutual  Recognition Agreement (see  section 4.1.) and  working towards 
regulatory  cooperation  (see  section  4.2.)  to  augment  the  impact  of  the  existing 
numerous sectoral dialogues. 
2.6.2.  Non-use of  international standards 
A particular problem in the US is the relatively low level of use, or even awareness, of 
standards set by international standardising bodies.  All parties to the WTO Agreement 
on· Technical Barriers to Trade are committed to  the wider use of these standards; but 
although  a  significant  number  of  US  standards  are  claimed  to  be  "technically 
equivalent" to  international ones,  very  few  indeed are directly adopted.  Some are in 
direct contradiction. 
Illustrative cases: 
•  The 1990 Fastener Quality Act (FQA), which aims to  deter the introduction 
of sub-standard industrial fasteners into the US, includes onerous compliance costs.  It 
also imposes a method of testing "lot-by-lot", which is  burdensome as compared with 
other means of ensuring quality.  The FQA has  thus the effect of requiring European 
manufacturers to revert to final sampling and testing methods at a time when they have 
invested heavily in  internationally agreed quality assurance systems such as ISO 9000, 
designed  to  improve  quality  and  reduce  the  need  for  multiple  assessments. 
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Furthermore,  the  Technology Transfer Improvement Act of 1995,  recently  signed 
into law,  widens the scope FQA.  The new statute repeals the Commerce Secretary's 
right to  waive the requirement of the FQA for fasteners  in  "non critical applications". 
This  effectively  extends  the  scope  of the  FQA  to  all  fasteners  in  commercial  use. 
Regulations to implement the FQA are being drawn up by the US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology and it will be necessary to ensure that they allow for the use 
of internationally-agreed assurance systems such as ISO 9000. 
•  The Nutrition Labelling and Education Act 1990 requires certain products to 
be  labelled  as  to  their  content.  The  EU  is  concerned  that  the  rules  differ  from 
international standards on labelling established by the Codex Alimentarius (upon which 
the corresponding EU legislation is based) and, furthermore, that this legislative action 
would have serious negative consequences on EU-US trade in foodstuffs.  As it stands, 
the proposed implementing legislation would result in significant commercial obstacles 
to EU food products marketed in the US and vice-versa. 
2.6.3.  Discriminatory standards 
In January 1996 a WTO dispute settlement panel issued its report on US standards for 
reformulated and conventional gasoline.  The complaint was brought by Venezuela and 
Brazil,  with  the EC intervening  in  their support.  Under the  Clean Air Act,  the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had issued a Gasoline Rule, which stipulates 
that  from  1  January  1995  only  gasoline  of  a  specified  cleanliness  (reformulated 
gasoline) may be sold in  areas of high air pollution.  In  other areas, only gasoline no 
dirtier than that sold in the base year of 1990 (conventional gasoline) may be sold.  The 
problem  with  this  regulation  is  that  it  lays  down  methods  of calculating  the  1990 
baseline  which  give  a  more  advantageous  treatment  to  domestic  products  than  to 
imported products.  The panel ruled that this was a violation of the national treatment 
obligation of Article ID:4 GATT, which was not necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant  life  or health  under  Article  XX(b)  GATT  nor  related  to  the  conservation  of 
exhaustible natural resources under Article XX(g) GATT. 
The US  has appealed this  ruling.  The EU has intervened before the appellate body, 
given that it has a substantial trade interest in the matter and in view of the importance 
of the  legal  principles  involved.  While  the  EU is  in  favour  of the  environmental 
objectives pursued, it considers that this should be done in  a manner which does not 
distort the competitive conditions between US products and imports.  On 29 April 1996 
the  WTO  Appellate  Body  released  its  report  which  found  the  EPA  regulation  on 
imported gasoline to be in breach of WTO rules. 
2.6.4.  Regulatory differences at State level 
There are more than  2,700 State  and  municipal  authorities  in  the US  which  require 
particular safety certifications for products sold  or installed within their jurisdictions. 
These  requirements  are  not  always  uniform  or  consistent  with  each  other,  or even 
transparent.  In  particular,  individual  States  sometimes  set  environmental  standards 
going far beyond what is provided for at federal level. Agricultural and food imports are 
also  often  confronted  with  additional  state-level  requirements,  which  may  lead  to 
obstacles to trade. 
Acquiring the necessary information and satisfying the necessary procedures is a major 
undertaking  for  a  foreign  enterprise,  especially a  small  or medium sized  one,  as  at 
present  there  is  no  central  source  of  information  on  standards  and  conformity 
assessment.  One company has estimated the volume of lost sales in the US due to the 
multiplicity of standards and certification problems to be about 15% of their total sales. 
The expense of certification alone was put at 5% of total sales, as was the amount spent 
on product liability insurance (a far less significant factor in Europe). 
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The hidden  costs could be much  greater because the time and  cost involved  can  be 
greatly reduced simply by using US  components which have already been individually 
tested and certified.  This is particularly the case for electrical products. 
In addition, the private organisations providing quality assurance may impose the use of 
certain  specific  product  components  under  their  own  programs  which  are  not  in 
conformity with  international quality assurance standards (ISO 9000).  In  some cases 
(e.g. that of telecommunications network equipment) an expensive evaluation procedure 
is  required  which  does  not  lead  to  certification  and  does  not  take  account  of any 
additional requirements by individual buyers. 
Illustrative Cases: 
•  EU exporters of ceramic ware must comply both  with  Federal regulations  setting 
tolerance levels on the amount of lead in ceramic ware, and with those enacted by State 
legislatures such as  California (which are more stringent than  both the internationally 
recommended level and the current federal limit). 
•  California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65) 
requires a special  warning label on  all  products containing substances known  to  the 
State of California to cause birth defects or reproductive harm, including lead. 
•  In  order to sell electrical appliances in  certain States it is  a legal necessity (and, in 
others,  a  commercial  one)  to  obtain  approval  by  Underwriters'  Laboratories  (UL) 
against its standards.  UL has complete discretion on its standards and, on occasion, can 
make seemingly arbitrary changes to them. 
•  For example, in early 1993 UL revised standard 1028 on hair clipping and shaving 
appliances, amending the specifications for the on/off switch.  The new UL requirement 
adds  nothing  to  the  safety of these  appliances,  but  will  cause considerable costs  to 
European  manufacturers.  It has  also  required  the  subsequent  modification  of the 
related International Electrotechnical Commission standards (endorsed by CENELEC). 
2.6.5.  Labelling requirements 
Providing consumers with  accurate,  useful information is  certainly in  everyone's best 
interest.  However, sometimes the information required to be put on a label seems to be 
specifically designed to  influence consumer behaviour.  For other products,  labelling 
requirements seem to  be another way of slowing down the process of getting a new 
product to the market. 
Illustrative cases: 
•  The  American  Automobile  Labelling  Act  provides  that,  from  October  1994, 
passenger cars and other light vehicles must be labelled with, inter alia, the proportion 
of US/Canadian made parts and the final point of assembly.  These requirements seem 
to  be  intended  to  influence  consumers  to  buy  cars  of US/Canadian  origin.  They 
.constitute an unjustifiable discrimination, contrary to Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, 
as  the  obligation  to  indicate  engine  and  gearbox  origin  could  discourage  US 
constructors from importing parts from European component manufacturers.  Moreover, 
since EU rules are quite flexible, due to the internal market, parts for any single model 
of motor vehicle may originate from  one of several countries.  The US  proposal will 
therefore  have  greater  administrative  costs  for  European  importers  than  for  other 
importers.  In  addition,  the  fulfilment  of the  labelling  requirement  may  involve  the 
disclosure of confidential data from non-US manufacturers. 
The EU is seriously concerned that the implementation of the labelling requirement will 
create unnecessary trade barriers, and put an excessive financial burden on importers to 
the US market.  It has therefore taken up in the issue in the TBT framework. 
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•  With  respect to  wine  labelling,  there  exist procedures,  both  at  Federal  and  State 
level, for the approval of labels on the front and rear of wine bottles.  In  general, an 
average of three months is required to obtain label approval at the Federal level and, at 
the State level, the approval period varies from State to State but may be as long as six 
weeks.  This renders the approval procedure time-consuming, confusing to exporters 
(who have to comply with different regimes from State to State) and costly. 
2.6.6.  A heavy regulatory approach 
Against  the  background  of  an  international  trend  towards  deregulation  or  the 
minimising  of  third  party  intervention  in  the  regulatory  process,  one  problem 
experienced in  the US  is  the continued reliance on  third party conformity assessment 
procedures for many industrial products. 
In  several  sectors,  such  as  that  of electrical  equipment  and  domestic  appliances, 
technological development and consumer awareness have permitted public regulators 
around  the  world  to  reduce  the  extent  of  pre-marketing  third  party  testing  and 
certification, in favour of self-certification by manufacturers backed up by post-market 
surveillance and control.  In the US however, third party certification in these sectors is 
still mandatory, and as such may pose disproportionately high costs on suppliers to the 
US market. 
Elsewhere,  the  continued concentration of certification authority  in  the  hands  of US 
regulatory agencies, rather than more devolved procedures for conformity assessment, 
again  appears to buck the international trend  towards more trade friendly  and market 
responsive approaches to regulation. 
2.6. 7.  US approval procedures for drugs and drug ingredients 
In  the  US  a  new  medicinal  product  must  be  approved  by  the  Food  and  Drug 
Administration  (FDA)  before  it  can  be  commercialised.  Long  and  uncertain 
administrative procedures prevail in the FDA in cases of approval of foreign drugs.  For 
instance, in order to demonstrate the quality of a medicinal product, manufacturers have 
to observe standards, as set out in monographs of the US Pharmacopoeia.  The latter is a 
commercial body without legislative association to the FDA.  Therefore, new standards 
are delayed due to the "negotiation" between Pharmacopoeia and the FDA. 
Moreover, by means of an  "over-the-counter" (OTC) procedure, approved ingredients 
of a  drug  are  put  on  a  list  (OTC-Monograph)  by  the  FDA,  so  that  different  final 
products derived from these ingredients can be marketed simultaneously.  However, the 
OTC drug approval procedure requires a drug ingredient to have a US  market history. 
This restricts market access for OTC products with long-standing marketing experience 
in countries with equally sophisticated drug regulatory systems. 
This  problem is  encountered  by  all  OTC  drugs  in  the  US  and,  specifically,  by  EU 
phytomedicines.  A  petition  regarding  this  matter  has  been  filed  by  the  European-
American  Phytomedicines  Coalition  (EAPC),  aimed  at  the  use  of foreign  marketing 
data to support the simplified OTC Drug Review for European phytomedicines. 
In addition, the problem of admission of European suntan lotions to the US market was 
first  raised  with  the  FDA  in  1991.  The FDA also  received  a  petition  by  European 
cosmetic firms  to  open the simplified drug approval procedure to  UV  -filters that had 
already been accepted in the EU.  The FDA indicated in  1992 that it would examine its 
current  approval  scheme  with  particular  regard  to  this  matter.  A  decision  is  still 
pending. 
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2. 7.  The Protection of Intellectual Property 
2.7.1.  Introduction 
With the entry into force of the WTO, the area of intellectual property is now subject to 
additional international disciplines.  In implementing the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the US has recently made 
a number of modifications to its legislation. 
These changes are  welcome,  but the EU remains concerned that the amendments to 
patent legislation made by the US in the context of implementing the TRIPs Agreement 
remain insufficient to resolve the discriminatory practices identified by the 1989 GATT 
panel and that no action is being initiated on government use of patented items. 
2. 7.2.  Patents and related areas 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides remedies for holders of US patents with 
a  view  to  keeping  imported  goods  which  are  infringing  such  patents out of the  US 
("exclusion order") or to have them removed from the US  market once they have come 
into the country ("cease and desist order").  These procedures are carried out by the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) and are not available against domestic products 
infringing  US  patents.  Under  the  1988  Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act, 
several modifications have been introduced to Section 337, such as the availability of 
remedies in relation to imported goods which infringe a US process patent. 
The GATT Panel Report which was adopted by the Contracting Parties in  November 
1989 came to the conclusion that Section 337 was inconsistent with GATT Article ill:4. 
The provision in  question accords to imported products alleged to infringe US  patent 
rules  treatment  less  favourable  than  that  accorded  under  Federal  District  Court 
procedures to like products of US.  Some modifications have been made to Section 337 
in the context of implementing the TRIPs Agreement; however, the US has to date not 
taken  appropriate  measures  in  order to  fully  do  away  with  the  main  discriminating 
features of Section 337. 
Moreover, the co-existence of fundamentally different patent systems (US first-to-invent 
system v.  first-to-file system followed in  the rest of the world) will continue to create 
interface problems. 
2.7.3.  Government use 
Under US  law (28 US  Code Section 1498) a patent owner may not enjoin or recover 
damages on the basis of his patent for infringements due to the manufacture or use of 
goods by or for the United States Government Authorities.  This practice is particularly 
frequent in the activities of the Department of Defence but is also extremely widespread 
in  practically  all  government  departments.  For  obvious  reasons  this  practice  is 
particularly detrimental to foreign right-holders because they will generally not be able 
to  detect such  governmental  use  and  are  thus  very  likely  to  miss  the  opportunity to 
initiate an administrative claims procedure. 
Article 31  of the TRIPs Agreement introduces a requirement to inform promptly a right 
holder about government use of his patent, but no action has been taken by the US so 
far to bring their legislation into conformity with this provision. 
2. 7.4.  Copyright and related areas 
Despite the unequivocal obligation contained in Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention, 
to which the US acceded in  1989, to make "moral rights" available for authors, the US 
has never introduced such rights and has repeatedly announced that it has no intention 
to do so in the future.  It is clear that while US authors fully benefit from moral rights in 
the EU, the converse is  not true, which  leads to an  imbalance of benefits from Berne 
Convention membership to the detriment of the European side. 
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2. 7.5.  Geographical designations 
With  respect to  wines  and  spirits,  the  margin  of discretion  left to  the director of the 
Bureau  of  Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (BA  TF)  in  defining  the  status  of  a 
geographical name (i.e.  if the name is  non-generic,  semi-generic or generic) may give 
rise  to  violations  of the  TRIPs  Agreement,  in  particular articles  23.1  and  24.3  (cf. 
section 3.1.7.). 
Moreover,  the  amendment  to  the  US  trademark  law  adopted  for  the  purpose  of 
implementing  TRIPs  Agreement  article  24.5,  (the  "trademarks  grand-father clause") 
gives a priority to  any  use of a geographical indication as  a trade mark before  1995. 
However the TRIPs Agreement article 24.5 grants priority only to a trademark used in 
good faith before this date.  Thus the question of a trademark used or registered in bad 
faith in the US (i.e. to benefit from the reputation of a geographical indication) needs to 
be addressed. 
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Tax policy options are expected to play a significant role in the run-up to the November 
1996 elections  in  the  US.  Various radical  tax  reform proposals are currently being 
debated, including a national sales tax,  a flat tax  and  a progressive consumption tax. 
This  debate  is  taking  place  against  the  background  of continued  uncertainty  over 
whether the tax reform proposals will provide sufficient revenue,  with  the possibility 
that greater pressure might fall  on foreign taxpayers as  a result.  While no significant 
legislative change is anticipated until next year at the earliest, the implications of each 
proposal for international investment need to be thoroughly examined in  terms of their 
potential  negative  impact  on  European  investors  (the  banking  branch  profits  tax  is 
covered in section 3.6.5.). 
On the positive side, the OECD Council's approval of new transfer pricing guidelines in 
July 1995 should greatly benefit international business. These ensure an internationally 
agreed standard for allocating taxable profits between jurisdictions. 
The extent of the reservation for sub-federal tax measures which the US is seeking from 
the GATS continues, however, to  give cause for concern.  Finding the right solution 
will  be of considerable importance both for tax  policy and for the GATS  as  a whole 
(because of its wider impact on the application of national treatment at the sub-federal 
level). 
2.8.2.  Cumbersome and discriminatory reporting 
Information reporting  The  information  reporting  requirements  of the  US  Tax Code as  applied  to  certain 
requirements  foreign-owned  corporations · mean  that  domestic  and  foreign  companies  are  treated 
differently.  These rules  apply to  foreign  branches and to  any corporation that has  at 
least one 25% foreign  shareholder.  They require the maintenance, or the creation, of 
books and records relating to transactions with related parties.  The documents must be 
stored  at  a  place specified by  the  US  tax  authorities,  and  an  annual  statement filed 
containing information about dealings with related parties.  There are stiff penalties for 
non-compliance with the various provisions. 
Internationally 
agreed approach 
overlooked 
These  requirements  are  onerous.  Although  their  purpose,  the  prevention  of  tax 
avoidance and evasion, is  reasonable, they are burdensome and add to the complexity 
for foreign-owned corporations of doing business in the US. 
2.8.3.  "Earnings stripping" provisions 
The so-called "earnings stripping" provisions in Internal Revenue Code 163j limit the 
tax deductibility of interest payments made to "related parties" which are not subject to 
US  tax,  and  of interest  payments  on  loans  guaranteed  by  such  related  parties.  In 
practice, most "related parties" affected will be foreign corporations. 
The  provisions  are  designed  to  prevent  foreign  companies  from  avoiding  tax  by 
financing a US  subsidiary with  a disproportionately high amount of debt as compared 
with equity, with the result that profits are paid out of the US in the form of deductible 
interest  payments  rather  than  as  dividends  out  of taxed  income.  This  objective  is 
reasonable and in line with internationally agreed tax policy.  However, the US rules for 
calculating the ceiling in any year oh the amount of admissible interest uses a formula, 
the results of which can be inconsistent with the internationally accepted arm's-length 
principle. If, ultimately, this leads to the disallowance of relief for the interest payable, it 
could  have  discriminatory consequences,  because  a  tax  treaty  partner would  not  be 
obliged to make a corresponding adjustment to taxable profits in the other country. 
The provisions relating to  loans guaranteed by related parties could also disallow the 
interest on a number of ordinary commercial arrangements with US banks, and provide 
a disincentive from raising loans with them. 
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2.8.4.  State unitary income taxation 
Certain  US  States  (Alaska,  Arizona,  California,  Colorado,  Connecticut,  District  of 
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New  York, Ohio, Rhode Island and West Virginia) assess State corporate income tax 
for foreign-owned corporations on  the basis of an  arbitrarily calculated proportion of 
their  total  world-wide  profits.  This  proportion  is  calculated  in  such  a  way  that  a 
company may  have to  pay tax on income arising  outside the  State,  so  giving  rise  to 
double taxation. 
"World-wide" unitary taxation  is  inconsistent with  bilateral tax  treaties concluded by 
the  US  at  the  Federal  level.  A  company  may  also  face  heavy compliance costs  in 
providing  details  of its  world-wide  operations.  International  attention  has  mainly 
focused on  California, which from 1986 has  allowed companies to elect for  "water's 
edge" unitary taxation instead.  Under this method, companies are taxed instead on the 
basis of a share of their total US (rather than world-wide) income. 
The 1994 US Supreme Court ruling that California's former world-wide unitary tax was 
not  unconstitutional  was  not  encouraging.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  remain 
concerned about unitary regimes and will keep a watch on possible developments. 
2.8.5.  US taxes discriminating against imported cars 
The US levies the following three taxes/charges on the sales of cars in the US that raise 
concern to European auto-makers: 
The Luxury Tax is an excise tax imposed since 1990 on cars valued above an arbitrary 
threshold, currently around $33,000.  The tax has a higher incidence on  imported cars 
than on US produced cars.  Originally it also applied to leisure boats and jewellery but 
these items were later exempted due to pressure from US producers. 
The CAFE payment is  a civil penalty payment levied on a manufacturer or importer 
whose range of models has an  average fuel efficiency below a certain level, currently 
27.5 miles per gallon (mpg).  CAFE favours large integrated car makers or producers of 
small cars  rather than  those  who  concentrate on  the top  of the car market,  such  as 
importers of European cars. 
The so-called Gas Guzzler Tax is an excise tax of $1,000- 7,700 per car, levied on all 
cars  not  meeting  fuel  economy  standards  set  by  the  US  Environmental  Protection 
Agency (EPA), currently 22.5 mpg.  This fuel economy cut-off point is not founded on 
any reasonable or objective criterion and leads to discrimination against imported cars. 
European auto-makers, with a total market share in the US of only 4%, bear nearly 70% 
of the revenue generated by  the  luxury tax,  85% of that by  the  Gas  Guzzler tax  and 
almost 100% of the CAFE penalties. 
After holding  two  rounds of consultations  with the US  in  1992, the EC requested  a 
GATT Panel to examine the  measures  with  respect to  GATT Article  XXill: 1.  The 
panel's report was issued on 30 September 1994.  Its results were mixed. 
2.8.6.  Foreign Sales Corporations 
US  legislation authorising so-called Foreign Sales Corporations (26 USC sections 921-
27)  provides  that,  under  specific  conditions,  certain  income  earned  by  a  foreign 
subsidiary of a US corporation will not be subject to US tax. The statute's presumption 
as to income allocation is questionable and may give rise to an objectionable tax benefit 
accruing  to  US  firms.  Foreign  Sales  Corporations  are  often  used  in  the  aeronautics 
sector (see section 3.3.2.). 
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2.9.  Conditional National Treatment 
2.9.1.  Introduction 
The principle of National  Treatment - that Foreign  Direct Investment  should  not be 
treated less favourably than domestic enterprises in like situations - is one of the pillars 
of the  liberalisation  in  the  world  economy  and  a  well  established  legal  standard  in 
bilateral treaties and multilateral agreements.  In OECD member states as well as world-
wide, there has been a trend to remove barriers to the entry of foreign investment and to 
extend the application of national treatment by gradually removing existing restrictions. 
However,  there  still  exist  in  the  US,  as  in  other  countries,  some  long-established 
exceptions to this principle. 
Although the EU has at various times raised the issue with the US  Administration, at 
both  political  and  senior  official  level,  the  US  has  failed  to  date  to  provide  any 
indications of how to handle the EU' s concerns. 
The European  Commission  attaches  great  importance  to  addressing  the  Conditional 
National  Treatment  (CNT)  issue  both  as  part  of the  negotiations  of a  new  EC-US 
Science and  Technology agreement  and  in  the framework  of the  OECD  Multilateral 
Agreement  on  Investment  negotiations.  In  particular,  the  European  Commission  is 
insisting on the resolution of the issue through the establishment of common eligibility 
requirements for project funding. 
2.9.2.  What is Conditional National Treatment? 
CNT generally refers  to  the  treatment of foreign-owned  firms  that is  less favourable 
than that of domestic firms.  The conditioning of investment may take the form of: 
Specific  reciprocity  requirements:  the  investment  is  allowed  only  to  the  extent  that 
"comparable"  or  "equivalent"  opportunities  are  available  to  US  firms  in  the  home 
country of the investor.  In  some cases, such requirements may  not even be related to 
the  sector in  which  the foreign  company wants  to  be economically active in  the US 
("cross-sectoral reciprocity"). 
Performance requirements: relating either to  the contribution of the foreign  controlled 
company's  activities  on  the  US  economy  and  employment,  or to  the  realisation  of 
specified parameters of production (volume, local content). 
The EU  has  become  increasingly  concerned  over  recent  years  about  US  legislation 
taking the form of tests on whether a company, legally established in the US  but whose 
ownership is foreign, meets certain conditions and requirements.  CNT language is most 
notable  in  the area of science and  technology and concerned the  granting  of federal 
subsidies  for  research  and  development,  or  other  advantages,  to  US-incorporated 
affiliates of foreign companies. 
Examples of conditional national treatment can be found in the American Technology 
Pre-eminence Act of 1991 that authorises the Advanced Technology Programme, the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992  that  authorises  federal  programmes  and  joint  ventures 
between  industry  and  government laboratories  in  energy-related  R&D,  the  National 
Cooperative Production Act of 1993, which extends the favourable antitrust treatment 
applying  to  joint  R&D  ventures  to  joint  manufacturing  ventures  and  in  the  1993 
Defence Appropriations Act that authorises the Technology Reinvestment Project, a 
programme  designed  to  ease  conversion  from  defence  to  civilian  manufacturing  by 
funding technology development and deployment as well as education and training. 
The current Congress,  although  mainly  focused  on  scaling down  federal  support for 
technology programmes, also passed new CNT provisions.  In  particular,  language to 
this effect can be found in the Advance Lithography Program which deals with research 
on  semiconductor  materials  and  processes,  and  which  is  included  in  the  Defence 
Department Authorisation bill signed into law by the President on February of this year. 
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Although  US  subsidiaries  of European  firms  have  been  able  to  participate  in  some 
programmes,  the  fact  remains  that satisfying the  eligibility conditions can  be  a more 
cumbersome  process  for  foreign  owned  companies.  By  contrast,  EU  science  and 
technology  programmes  do  not  discriminate  against  locally-incorporated  affiliates  of 
foreign businesses. 
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3.  SECTORAL ISSUES 
3.1.  Agriculture and fisheries 
3.1.1.  Introduction 
The settlement of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the establishment of the WTO 
has far reaching consequences for international agricultural trade, and brought about a 
distinct relaxation in  agricultural trade tensions between the European Union  and the 
United States, which has traditionally been one of the more contentious areas of trade 
relations.  The rapid conclusion of the WTO Article XXIV :6 negotiations on the impact 
of the enlargement of the EC has also contributed to easing trade tension. 
However,  notwithstanding  this  fact,  a  variety  of issues  remain  unresolved  and  some 
others have re-emerged.  There are acute difficulties in  the sanitary and phytosanitary 
fields in  spite of some progress within the framework of the European Commission -
US  Department of Agriculture (USDA) dialogue and  the Agreement on  Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures (SPS) in the Uruguay Round. 
3.1.2.  Sanitary and  phytosanitary requirements 
Differences in US and EU sanitary and phytosanitary requirements can have restrictive 
effects on trade.  A variety of EU exports to the US  have encountered problems due to 
delays in  US  Customs sampling and inspection procedures, resulting in  damage to the 
goods and subsequent commercial losses for the exporters.  The EU does  not dispute 
the right of the  US  authorities to  inspect imported goods but considers that adequate 
steps should be taken to deal expeditiously with perishable goods. 
In  particular,  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration's  time-consuming  controls  on  the 
detection  of pit  fragments  in  imports  of canned  peaches  from  the  EU  has  lead  to 
detention and subsequent destruction or obligatory re-export of this product, hampering 
the flow of trade and negatively affecting the volume of exports. 
In the phytosanitary field, the following main difficulties persist: 
Regulations  governing  the  entry  of apples  and  pears  from  certain  member  states 
(Federal  Register of 1987,  Title VII,  Ch.  3,  §319-56-2r)  provide  for  a pre-clearance 
programme, with the aim of guaranteeing, prior to shipment, that consignments are free 
from an insect pest known  as the pear leaf blister moth and from "other pests that do 
not exist in the US or that are not widespread in the US". 
Operating in  this  way on  the basis of an  open  list is  not a scientific approach and is 
contrary to the spirit of  tran~parency as provided for in the International Plant Protection 
Convention.  The stringent inspections and  the increased costs arising from the pre -
clearance programme have clearly had a negative effect on  EU exports of apples and 
pears to the US.  Consultations with the aim of implementing the "inspection at port of 
arrival" option have recently resumed. 
Pathogen free regions  The prohibition of the import of fruit and vegetables from pathogen-free regions of an 
EU Member States adjacent to regions  in  which a given pathogen is  known to occur 
(Federal  Register of 1987,  Title  VII,  Ch.  3,  §319-56-2r)  creates  undue  obstacles  to 
exports from pathogen-free regions  within  the EU.  An  example is the prohibition of 
imports of tomatoes from Brittany because of the presence of the Mediterranean Fruit 
Fly in the Mediterranean regions of France.  Although Brittany is ecologically isolated 
from the infested regions of France, and the French authorities carry out the necessary 
surveillance to  avoid dissemination  of the  pest,  imports  into the US  of ripe tomatoes 
from Brittany are not allowed by the US authorities.  The EU considers these measures 
to be excessive and not justifiable on phytosanitary grounds. 
Potted plants  The revised provisions on  standards and certification of plants established in  growing 
media (Federal Register 7,  §319-37-8) have reduced the obstacles encountered by EU 
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exports  of potted  plants  to  the  US.  However,  the  certification  of plant genera  for 
example Azaleas  involves  a  very  long  procedure  which  may  considerably delay the 
approval of EU plant genera. 
USDA published a Final Rule in  the Federal Register of 13  January  1995, effective 
from 13 February 1995, which will permit the import into the US offour plant genera in 
sterile  growing  media.  USDA  is  however deferring  final  action  on  Rhododendron 
pending  further  study  by  the  Fish  and  Wildlife  Service,  due  to endangered  species 
concerns.  The new rule comes after over a decade of lobbying activities by European 
plant growers, supported by the Commission and Member States. 
Unfortunately,  the  new  rule  contains  some  requirements  which  are  difficult  for 
exporters to  fulfil,  for  example it is  impossible to  satisfy certain  obligations because 
some of the species or genera involved have a growth cycle which is  shorter than the 
waiting period required by USDA before export can take place. 
In July 1992 the California Court of Appeals ruled that the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) must strictly apply the terms of the Delaney Clause, which requires the 
establishment of zero tolerance levels in  processed food  for any substance (including 
pesticides) which have been shown to induce cancer at some concentration in laboratory 
test animals,  regardless  of how  low  the  risk  is  in  reality.  Prior to  this  ruling  EPA 
applied a negligible risk interpretation of the Clause, but this was rejected by the Court 
despite the validity of the scientific arguments advanced. 
Following this ruling, EPA has identified 36 pesticides which have shown carcinogenic 
effects in test animals and it will be reviewing at least 49 others over the next five years. 
Legislative  proposals  for  the  first  batch  of pesticides  have  already  been  made  and 
further proposals are expected in due course.  It is probable that trade in important EU 
products treated with pesticides, such as wine and olive oil, may be involved. 
The  mandatory  requirement  for  two  years'  post-entry  quarantine  on  an  importer's 
premises  for  hardy  nursery  stock  is  not justifiable on  plant  health  terms.  Its  main 
purpose is  believed to  be the  detection of latent infections or possible organisms not 
previously identified as a possible quarantine concern.  Although it may be appropriate 
for new or developing trade in specific commodities, the EU does not consider it to be 
justified as a permanent feature of  long-term trade. 
In the sanitary field the following difficulties persist: 
Like the EU, the US  has  introduced rules on the import of animal products and  by-
products  from  countries  where  Bovine  Spongiform  Encephalopathy  (BSE)  exists 
(docket number 90-252, Federal Register 56:  19794, April 30, 1991, amending 9 CFR 
parts  94  and  95).  These contain  specific  requirements  for  the  export of meat  from 
ruminant animals. 
However, while the EU has subjected its requirements for approval to the authoritative 
international institution in  this area,  the International Office for  Epizooties (IOE), the 
US has introduced measures which exceed those of the EU.  In particular, the US does 
not make any distinction between countries where the incidence of BSE is  high or low 
(the  latter  being  countries  with  occasional  cases)  while  the  EU  applies  restrictive 
measures only in countries with a high incidence of BSE.  As a result, French, Irish and 
Portuguese exports have been subject to requirements not deemed necessary under EU 
and IOE rules.  In this context also the issuing of US import permits for bovine embryos 
and semen from countries which have had cases of BSE has been suspended, although 
no formal change was made to the US import rules. 
The  US  has  established  unnecessarily  strict  conditions  for  the  participation  of 
piroplasmosis  positive  horses  in  the  1996  Atlanta  Olympic  Games.  The  Federation 
Equestre  International,  assisted  by  the  EU,  put  forward  detailed  suggestions  during 
1995 on measures to prevent any transmission of piroplasmosis and the establishment of 
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piroplasmosis  in  native  ticks.  However,  the  US  decided  to  exclude  piroplasmosis 
positive horses from the 3 day event, and to allow such horses to complete only in  the 
jumping and dressage events under exceedingly strict conditions. 
The US  imposes animal health restrictions on the import of goats on the grounds of the 
risk  of scrapie  in  sheep.  These  restrictions  are  even  less  justified  because  of the 
widespread presence of scrapie in the US sheep population. 
The EU has a comprehensive set of veterinary legislation completed under the Single 
Market programme and  apart from  certain  specific  restrictions based on  the relevant 
disease  status  there  is  free  movement  of  live  animals  and  animals  within  the 
Community.  Nevertheless the US  continues to  treat the Community on  an  individual 
Member State basis for the majority of issues, thus excluding many products from many 
Member States from access to the US market. 
The EU operates  a policy of regionalisation,  where  restrictions  are applied  in  zones 
affected  by  certain  animal  diseases,  with  free  movement  of animals  and  products 
outside the affected zones.  An animal or product fit for movement is then considered fit 
for export.  The principle of regionalisation as an effective means of controlling animal 
disease has now been incorporated into the US Tariff Act 1930 by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFfA) and is part of the WTO Agreement on the application 
of sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures.  However,  US  import  administrative  rules 
concerning Foot and Mouth Disease, Rinderpest and other relevant diseases have still 
not been amended to reflect this change in legislation, despite a clear commitment in the 
EC/US agreement on application of the Third Country Meat Directive, reached in  1992. 
The US  published a proposed rule on "Importation of Animals and Animal products" 
covering only ruminants and swine on 18 April 1996, and the EU will make comments 
on this proposed rule. 
The consequence of the current US  position on regionalisation can be illustrated by the 
example of African Swine Fever (ASP).  Because of the presence, in the past, of ASF in 
a small region of Spain, there is  still a restriction of imports of certain pork products 
from Spain. 
Other restrictions on live animals relate to the non-recognition by the US  of the EU' s 
freedom from certain diseases. 
Non-comminglement means that establishments exporting meat or meat products to the 
US  may not handle meat or meat products from countries which are not recognised as 
being free  from certain diseases of concern to  the US,  and that there is  no  mixing of 
meat  or  meat  products  destined  for  the US  with  meat  or  meat  products  from  such 
countries.  The EC/US agreement on application of the Third Country Meat Directive, 
provides  for  an  establishment  to  handle  both  categories  of meat  or  meat  products 
provided that there is a separation in time between them.  So far,  however, the US  has 
not been willing to apply this provision of the agreement. 
Imports into the US  of uncooked meat products (sausage, ham and bacon) have been 
subject to a long-standing prohibition.  Following repeated approaches by the EU, US 
import regulations  were  modified to  permit the  import of Parma ham,  Serrano  hams, 
Iberian hams, Iberian pork shoulders and Iberian pork loins.  However, US  still applies 
a prohibition on other types of uncooked meat products, e.g.  San Daniele ham, German 
sausage, "Ardennes" ham despite the fact  that meat products may come from disease 
free regions and that the processing involved should render any risk negligible. 
The import of egg products is allowed only under very strict conditions, in  particular, 
. the  requirement  for  continuous  inspection  of the  production  process.  A  system  of 
periodic inspection of the production process would be acceptable from a human health 
point  of view,  but  continuous  inspection  is  superfluous  and  expensive,  and  has  a 
negative effect on prices and competitiveness. 
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The import of dairy products  made from unpasteurised  milk such  as  soft cheese,  for 
which there is a ready market in the US  is generally prohibited, even though a number 
of US States permit the production and marketing of such products. 
3.1.3.  Bananas 
Following the  17 October 1994 opening of an  investigation under Section 301  of the 
1974  Trade  Act  to  ascertain  if the  EU's  banana  regime  is  adversely  affecting  US 
economic  interests,  the USTR published a preliminary finding  against our system in 
January 1995.  However, the EU considers that there is  no justification for the US  to 
take unilateral action.  The US has now sought a WTO panel on the EC banana regime. 
3.1.4.  Export subsidies 
The US  operates a range of programmes designed to subsidise and/or promote exports 
of US  agricultural products.  The US  has continued to  maintain  an  aggressive export 
policy for agricultural products.  This approach has been confirmed by the recent Farm 
Bill adopted by Congress. 
The Export Enhancement Program (EEP)  allows US  exporters to  apply for a cash 
subsidy designed to make US  products competitive with subsidised exports from other 
nations.  EEP has  been  capped at  $  350  million  in  fiscal  year  1996  but applies  to 
products exported to over 70 countries.  Currently operating in the same manner as EEP 
is  the  Dairy  Export  Incentive  Program  (DEIP)  which  is  also  used  for  market 
development purposes. 
The Market Access Program formerly the Market Promotion Program (MPP) offers 
a share of costs for promotion campaigns for agricultural products (the majority being 
high value and value added) in selected export markets The new Farm Bill provide $ 90 
million annually for fiscal1996-2002. 
The Export Credit Guarantee Program offers US  government guarantees of short-
term GSM-102 (6  months- 3 years) and medium-term GSM-103  (3-10 years) private 
bank loans at commercial interest rates.  There is no eligible list of commodities, though 
bulk  products  are  the  main  beneficiaries.  It  is  targeted  at  countries  which  need 
guarantees to secure financing but show a reasonable ability to repay. 
The Emerging Markets Program is funded under the new Farm Bill to the tune of$ l 
billion during fiscal 1996-2002 with$ 10 million annually for technical assistance. 
Public law 480 food aid programs have amongst their other (generally altruistic) aims 
the expansion of foreign markets for US agricultural products. 
Under the terms of the Uruguay Round agreement all countries, including the US, have 
agreed  progressively to  reduce their expenditure on  agricultural export subsidies,  set 
against a 1986-90 base period, by a total of 36% over six years,  and during the same 
period to reduce the quantity of subsidised exports for each product category by 21%. 
3.1.5.  Import arrangements 
Under the terms of the Uruguay Round agreement, the former Section 22 import quotas 
are  to  be  replaced  by  Tariff Rate  Quotas  (TRQs),  where  a  prescribed  quantity  of a 
product may be imported at a lower rate  of duty,  with any quantities in  excess being 
subjected to higher tariffs.  The EC is monitoring closely the management of the quotas 
by  the  US  Administration.  The  EC  has  held ·detailed  discussions  with  the  US 
Administration, particularly on the management of the dairy quotas.  The EC remains 
concerned about certain in-built rigidities in the licensing arrangements. 
As regards the proposed new methods for the management of the tariff rate quota for 
tobacco, negotiated under Article XXVill of the GATT, the EC is concerned that these 
methods seem more restrictive than the existing ones. 
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3.1.6.  Inadequate protection of geographical indications of European  wines  and 
designations of  spirits 
Enforcement of rights to a geographical indication in the US mainly depends on Bureau 
of Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (BA  TF) regulation  for  the  labelling  of wine  and 
spirits which leaves the director of the BA  TF a large latitude of discretion, in particular 
in the definition of when a geographical name is a generic name and when it is not. 
In  1983, an  exchange of letters  between the EC and the  US  provided a measure  of 
protection for EC geographical names that designate wine.  The US  undertook not to 
appropriate  such  names,  if known  by  the  US  consumer  and  unless  this  use  by  US 
producers was traditional.  The exchange of letters expired in  1986 but the US  has in 
principle maintained its commitment to this undertaking. 
In April 1990 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BA  TF) published a list of 
examples  of "Foreign  Non-generic  Names  of Geographic  Significance  Used  in  the 
Designation of Wines".  However, many EU geographical designations do not figure on 
this  list and the EU indicated to BA  TF that the list,  as  published,  is  not satisfactory, 
since it does not ensure sufficient protection of EU wine denominations in the US.  A 
petition  to  BA  TF to  complete  the  list  of EU  protected  distinctive  indications  was 
rejected  on  the  grounds  of lack  of evidence  that  the  names  were  known  to  the  US 
consumer. 
Moreover, no progress has been achieved to date with respect to wine names defined as 
semi-generic under US  legislation.  The US  regulations allow some EU geographical 
denominations of great reputation to be used by American wine producers to designate 
products  of  US  origin.  The  most  significant  examples  are  Burgundy,  Claret, 
Champagne,  Chablis,  Chianti,  Malaga,  Madeira,  Moselle,  Port,  Rhine Wine  (Hock), 
Sauterne, Haut Sauterne and Sherry. 
American  producers  also  use  some  of the  most  prestigious  European  geographical 
indications as names of grape varieties.  This abuse could often mislead consumers as to 
the  true  origin  of the  wines.  Furthermore,  the  improper  use  of EU  geographical 
designations for wines places the respective EU products at a disadvantage on the US 
market. 
For example, on 5 April 1994 the BA  TF published in the Federal Register a Notice of 
Proposed  Rulemaking,  which  would  permit  the  use  of the  geographical  designation 
"Gamay Beaujolais" for a US  wine which BA  TF admits is  now known to  be neither 
Gamay nor Beaujolais.  The EC has strenuously objected to this, and BA  TF has so far 
taken  no  final  decision.  The French wine industry has  filed  a case at the US  District 
Court in  Washington D.C. against "the unlawful approval by BATF of the use of the 
name Gamay Beaujolais". 
With regard to spirits, the US regulations basically provide protection against practices 
misleading to the consumer.  This limited protection does not prohibit the improper use 
of designations  of  spirits  or  even  the  development  of certain  names  into  generic 
designations.  An agreement was approved by the EU in February 1994 for the mutual 
recognition of two US  and six EU designations and provides for future discussions on 
the possibilities of extending their mutual recognition to further designations. 
The Commission  services consider that US  practice which  leaves  the director of the 
BA TF a large margin of discretion in  deciding the status of a geographical name (i.e. 
whether a name is  non-generic, semi-generic or generic) may lead to  violations of the 
TRIPs Agreement (cf. chapter 2.7.). 
3.1.7.  Drift net  fishing 
The EU acknowledges the entitlement of the US to condition access to living resources 
in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  There seems to be a tendency, however, to use 
unilateral measures as  benchmarks of other countries'  policies,  with the possibility of 
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sanctioning accordingly.  The EU stresses the need for international cooperation in  this 
sector, as unilateral measures may not necessarily be the appropriate means of achieving 
the objective of conservation and may be destabilising for international trade. 
Amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1983 
(MFCMA) require the Department of Commerce to list nations whose nationals engage 
in large-scale drift net fishing in a manner unacceptable to the US authorities.  Such a 
nation may be certified for the purposes of the so-called "Pelly Amendment" and its 
marine products may be consequently embargoed. 
Under the provisions of the High Seas Drift Nets Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992 
the US Secretary of Commerce has identified Italy as "a nation for which there is reason 
to believe that its nationals or vessels are conducting large-scale driftnet fishing" and, if 
this issue has not been resolved at the end of the statutory consultation period, the US 
administration may impose an  embargo on Italian exports of fish  and fish  products to 
the US.  The EU has consistently opposed unilateral actions of this sort. 
The US introduced a compulsory system of Certificates of Origin for yellowfin tuna 
caught in  the Eastern Tropical  Pacific  since July  1992.  Certification  rules  are also 
applied for countries using large-scale trawl nets.  These rules may be considered to be 
a serious obstacle for EU exporters. 
3.1.8.  Shrimp 
Forty nine nations have been warned, subsequent to section 609 of Public Law 101-162, 
that their exports of shrimp to the US will be embargoed unless they provide evidence 
that their shrimp fishermen  have matched US efforts to  protect sea turtles. Three EU 
Member States:  Italy,  Spain  and Portugal figure  on  the  list  of countries  potentially 
affected:  Portugal  presented  a  demarche  to  the  Department  of State  in  May  1996 
underlining, inter alia, its concerns regarding the potential extraterritorial effect of this 
legislation. 
3.1.9.  Allocations to foreign fishing fleets 
Each  year,  the  US  fixes  the  total  allowable  level  of foreign  fishing  (TALFF)  and 
accordingly makes allocations to foreign fishing fleets.  Squid fishing possibilities for 
EU vessels off the east coast of the US have been gradually phased out under the terms 
of both  the  MFCMA  and  the  former  Governing  International  Fisheries  Agreement 
(GIFA)  in  favour of the development of the US  domestic  fishing  industry.  Though 
mackerel migrating off the east coast is the only stock currently identified as being in 
surplus in the US  EEZ, the US authorities have set a zero TALFF since 1990 for this 
stock,  following  pressure from the domestic industry to protect its  markets.  A  zero 
T  ALFF is proposed for 1996 too.  The EU believes that this line neither corresponds to 
the provisions and intentions of the MFCMA nor to the provisions of Article 62 of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The Jones Act (see also section 3.4.2.) blocks the potentially interesting possibility for 
EU fishermen to fish in US waters under a US flag as it provides that only fishing boats 
built in the US can fly the US flag, -thereby preventing the possibility of joint ventures 
and joint enterprises. 
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The  signature  of the  OECD  Shipbuilding  Agreement  in  December  1994,  on  the 
elimination of aids in the shipbuilding sector was a major achievement, and is expected 
to have a significant impact on US', and all other signatories', subsidies programmes in 
the shipbuilding sector. 
In December 1995 the European Community, South Korea and Norway deposited their 
instruments  of ratification  for  the  Agreement.  The  US  and  Japan  have  committed 
themselves to ratify so as to allow the entry into force of the Agreement in  July 1996. 
The Agreement aims to eliminate all direct and indirect support and to combat injurious 
pricing practices.  Provision is  made for a standstill on existing subsidy levels and on 
new measures of support during the intervening period, but allows for the continuation 
of previously committed aid subject to certain conditions.  The EU will closely monitor 
progress in the ratification and implementation of the Shipbuilding Agreement into US 
legislation and its impact on the existing subsidy programmes. 
3.2.2.  Shipbuilding: subsidies and tax policies 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as  amended,  provides  for  various  shipbuilding 
subsidies and tax deferments for projects meeting domestic build requirements.  These 
are provided via the Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS), the Capital Constructions 
Fund (CCF) and the Construction Reserve Fund (CRF).  These measures will have to be 
modified  by  the  US  Congress  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Shipbuilding 
Agreement. 
The Act also established the Federal Ship Financing Fund to assist the development of 
the US merchant marine by guaranteeing construction loans and mortgages on US flag 
vessels built in the United States.  In  1993 the guarantee program was extended to cover 
also  vessels  for  export.  The  Maritime  Administration  (MARAD)  issued  new  loan 
guarantees  as  follows:  in  1994 - $290  million;  in  1995  - $437  million  and  through 
March 1996- $477 million in new loan guarantees.  As of the end of March 1996, the 
fund  amounted  to  a  balance  of $2.14  billion.  As  an  example,  in  February  1996 
MARAD announced the approval of $215 million in  guarantees for the construction of 
five double-hull tankers. 
The  United  States  applies  a  50%  ad  valorem tax  on  non-emergency  repairs  of US 
owned ships outside the USA and on imported equipment for boats, including fishnets 
on the basis of Section 466 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as  amended in  1971  and 1990. 
Under  the  latter  amendment  the  tax  would  not  apply,  under  certain  conditions,  to 
foreign repairs of "LASH" (Lighter Aboard Ship) barges and spare vessel repair parts or 
materials.  This tax will also have to be abolished to conform with the provisions of the 
Shipbuilding Agreement.  The draft  implementation  bill  provides  for  such  abolition 
with respect to the Shipbuilding Agreement contracting parties. 
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3.3.  Aeronautics industry 
3.3.1.  Introduction 
The  EU  is  concerned  about  the  level  of  disguised  subsidies  to  the  US  aircraft 
manufacturing industry.  In  this context, the EU believes there  is  a clear need for a 
successful outcome to the on-going multilateral negotiations in this sector and looks to 
the US to play a constructive part in achieving it. 
3.3.2.  Specific problems 
The US  aircraft and aero-engines manufacturers benefit from massive US  government 
support  through  various  programmes.  Together,  these  programmes  have  a  marked 
impact on the competitiveness of the US civil aircraft industry. 
NASA's annual budget for civil aeronautics is around $1  billion, and is  used both for 
the  development· of a  new  supersonic  aircraft  and  advanced  subsonic  technologies. 
NASA's  stated  objective  is  to  expand  its  aeronautical  research  programmes  and 
"transfer[  ... ] the resulting new technology to the US civil aircraft industry". 
On  an  annual  basis,  the  DoD  spends  about  $  7  billion  on  aeronautics  research  and 
development.  US  large  civil  aircraft  manufacturers,  as  well  as  civil  engine 
manufacturers,  participate  in  such  programmes  and  benefit  from  the  substantial 
technological  spin-offs  which  are  then  applied  to  civilian  production.  In  addition, 
recent  initiatives  by  the  Clinton  administration  have  enhanced  programmes  for  the 
development and transfer of dual-use technologies,  defence  conversion  research  and 
reaffirmed the importance of the public-private partnership in aircraft sector. 
The US  aircraft industry also benefits from the DoD funding of Independent Research 
and  Development  (!R&D)  projects,  and  the  MANTECH  programme.  The  latter  is 
aimed  at  developing  and  encouraging  contractors  to  use  new  technologies  in  their 
manufacturing process. 
Finally the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  has an  annual aeronautics budget 
for  research  and  development  which  exceeds  $  2  billion.  One  of the  FAA's stated 
objectives is "to foster US civil aeronautics". 
Other advantages stem from special tax programmes.  One such example is  the use of 
so-called  Foreign  Sales  Corporations,  which,  although  they  are  available  to  all 
qualifying business, in practice have particularly benefited the US aircraft industry (see 
section 2.8.6.). 
Although this sector is the general subject to the WTO rules on subsidies, the EU calls 
for  new  specific  multilateral  rules  to  restrict  all  forms  of government  support  and 
intervention for  aircraft products.  The EU regretted  that,  at  the end of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, the US  blocked the adoption  of a new  Civil Aircraft Agreement 
supported by all other negotiating parties.  Although negotiations have continued since, 
no progress has been made. 
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3.4.  Maritime services 
3.4.1.  Introduction 
International maritime transport markets in  the US  are predominantly open.  However, 
significant restrictions remain on  the use of foreign  built vessels  in  the US  coastwise 
trade  and  in  relation  to  access  to  certain  international  cargoes  from  which  non-US 
vessels are excluded. Furthermore, the ease with  which new restrictions are frequently 
proposed in the US is a cause for concern and constant vigilance. 
Despite the fact that schedules of specific commitments and lists of MFN exceptions 
have yet to be definitively fixed, the EU remains hopeful that the introduction of GATS 
disciplines to  the  maritime  services  sector will  create a  better trade environment for 
shippers and ship operators both from the EU and from the US.  Although progress has 
been limited so far in the ongoing work of the WTO's Negotiating Group for Maritime 
Transport  Services,  the  EU  and  the  US  have  jointly committed  themselves  to  the 
successful  completion  of the  current negotiations  by  the  agreed  deadline of 30 June 
1996. The US reluctance to table an offer so far is a matter of concern. 
3.4.2.  Specific problems 
Foreign-built (or rebuilt) vessels are prohibited from engaging in  coastwise trade either 
directly between  two points of the  US  or via  a foreign  port.  Trade with  US  island 
territories and  possessions is included in  the definition  of coastwise trade  (Merchant 
Marine Act of 1920 - The Jones Act).  Moreover, the definition of vessels has been 
interpreted  by the  US  administration  to  cover hovercraft and  inflatable rafts.  These 
limitations  on  rebuilding  act  as  another discrimination  against foreign  materials:  the 
rebuilding of a vessel of over 500 Gross Tons (GT) must be carried out within the US  if 
it is to engage in coastwise trade.  A smaller vessel (under 500 GT) may lose its existing 
coastwise rights if the rebuilding aboard or in the US with foreign materials is extensive 
(46 U.S.C. 83, amendments of 1956 and 1960). 
In context of the negotiations for the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement, it was agreed that 
the Jones Act would be subject to a special review and to monitoring procedures. 
In  addition,  no  foreign-built  vessel  can  be  documented  and  registered  for  dredging, 
towing or salvaging in the US.  Third countries are thus not able to  have access to the 
US market at a time when part of the ageing US fleet needs to be renewed. 
The Jones Act also confers to  the American  Bureau of Shipping (ABS)  an  effective 
monopoly  over  ship  classification  and  inspection  services  for  the  US  Coast  Guard 
Administration.  EU classification companies are therefore excluded from this market. 
However,  the  still  pending  US  Coast  Guard  Authorisation  for  1995  contains  one 
important provision that would remove ABS's monopoly of US flag business. 
Section  710  of  the  Federal  Maritime  Commission  Authorisation  Act  of 1990 
dealing  with  Non-Vessel  Operating  Common  Carriers  (NVOCCs),  reinforced  the 
provisions of the 1984 Shipping Act, which requires NVOCCs to file tariffs.  This is 
still considered to be a great administrative burden and a disadvantage in  competition, 
particularly for  small  EU freight  forwarders.  The EU considers  these  financial  and 
administrative obligations an unnecessary and unwarranted burden on the international 
transportation industry. 
The US  have a number of statutes in  place which require certain types of government 
owned or financed cargoes to be carried on US-flag commercial vessels.  The impact of 
these cargo preference measures is  very significant.  They deny EU and other non-US 
competitors access to a very sizeable pool of US cargo, while providing US ship owners 
with guaranteed cargoes at protected, highly remunerative rates. 
In  particular,  the  Commission  is  studying the  conformity of such  measures  with  US 
obligations  agreements.  The application  of the  measures  to  US  public  procurement 
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contracts introduces  uncertainty for those businesses whose tenders include shipping 
goods to the US; whether they are required to ship the goods on US-flagged vessels, 
which charge significantly higher freight rates than other vessels,  is  not known until 
after the award of  the contract. 
The relevant legislative provisions are: 
•  The Cargo Preference Act of 1904 requires  that all  items procured for  or 
owned by the military departments be carried exclusively on US-flag vessels. 
•  Public Resolution N°17, enacted in  1934, requires that 100% of any cargoes 
generated by US Government loans (i.e. commodities financed by Eximbank loans) be 
shipped on US-flag vessels, although MARAD may grant waivers permitting up to 50% 
of the cargo to be shipped on vessels of the trading partner. 
•  The  Cargo Preference Act of 1954 requires  that  at  least  50%  of all  US 
government generated cargoes subject to law be carried on privately-owned US flag 
commercial vessels, if they are available at fair and reasonable rates. 
•  The Food Security Act of 1985 increases to 75% the minimum proportion of 
agricultural cargoes under certain foreign assistance programs to be shipped on US-flag 
vessels. 
In November 1995 President Clinton signed into effect legislation lifting the ban on the 
export  of Alaskan  oil,  though  reserving  such  shipments  to  US-flag  vessels.  This 
legislation represents a most unwelcome extension of the US cargo preference measures 
to commercial cargoes.  The Commission and a number of Member States, along with 
Norway and Japan, made representations to the US Administration during the passage 
of the proposed legislation through Congress.  In particular, the Community has made 
clear publicly that it considers that the final legislation is incompatible with the spirit of 
the  Uruguay  Round  Ministerial  Decision  on  Negotiations  on  Maritime  Transport 
Services,  is  contrary  to  the  OECD  Common  Principles  of  Shipping  and  clearly 
represents a discriminatory and protectionist measure. 
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There has been no  progress over the  last year on the EU's long-standing complaints 
about computer reservation  systems (CRS)  and  restrictions  on  ownership.  The recent 
enactment of the Hatch Amendment represents an unwelcome new development. 
3.5.1.  Specific problems 
As  far as  CRS  are concerned, no positive developments can be reported regarding the 
preference  given  to  "on-line"  services  (connections  with  the  same  carrier)  over 
"interline" services (connections with other carriers).  As noted in  previous editions of 
this Report, this practice implicitly disadvantages all non-US carriers which, unlike their 
US competitors, have to rely on interline connections for traffic to and from US  points 
other than their own gateways (behind gateway traffic). 
One way for European carriers to balance the competitive disadvantages created by the 
on-line  preferences  and  to  get  access  to  the  behind  gateway  passenger would  be  to 
invest  in  a  US  carrier.  Unfortunately,  the  Federal  Aviation  Act of 1958  prohibits 
foreign investors from taking more than a 49% stake in  a US  carrier and restricts the 
holding  of voting  stock  to  25%.  This  latter  limitation  makes  US  rules  on  foreign 
ownership considerably more restrictive than relevant EU rules. 
The Hatch  Amendment,  which  was  signed  into  law  on  24  April  1996,  requires  the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to apply security measures to foreign carriers, 
identical  to  those  already  applied  by  the  FAA  to  US  airlines  serving  the  same  US 
airports. Whilst the EU supports efforts to improve aviation security,  such  legislation 
amounts  to  a  breach  of international  agreements.  Efforts  to  improve  international 
aviation  security  should  be  handled,  as  has  hitherto  been  the  case,  by  multilateral 
negotiations. 
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3.6.  Financial services 
3.6.1.  Introduction 
The  US  financial  services  sectors  is  characterised  by  industry  and  geographic 
fragmentation, but this situation is rapidly changing.  The application of technology has 
increasingly blurred traditional product distinctions and  greater reliance on  electronic 
data flows is reinforcing the development of an interstate market underway as a result of 
the implementation of the interstate banking legislation passed in 1994.  In this dynamic 
environment, it is important that EU financial firms are given competitive opportunities 
comparable to  those afforded US  institutions as  new laws are passed and  regulations 
adopted. 
One of the  most critical  improvements  would  be  reform  of the  Glass-Steagall Act, 
which  continues  to  be  under  consideration  in  Congress.  If substantial  and  non-
discriminatory changes  are  adopted,  this  would  be a  major step  forward  for  the  US 
industry  in  general,  and  thus  for  EU  industry  too.  At  present,  if  a  financial 
conglomerate - foreign or domestic - includes a bank and if another financial company 
(e.g. an insurance company) or an industrial company within the conglomerate acquires 
25% or more of the bank's shares, the bank will have to cease- debank- its activities in 
the US.  It is not certain whether the adoption of financial modernisation legislation in 
the US  will  significantly ease the debanking problems faced  by EU  firms  in  the US 
market. 
Because  of  structural  differences  in  the  types  and  forms  of  banking  affiliations 
permitted for companies operating in the US  versus the European market, an EU firm 
may be required to give up its banking license in  the US as a result of, for example, a 
merger  in  Europe  rather  than  developments  in  the  US.  These  limitations  are  of 
particular concern to EU companies looking to exploit the new flexibility in the Single 
Market  to  develop  integrated  financial  services  operations.  We  would  expect  this 
problem to become more common for European firms operating in the US.  Ironically, 
US  authorities permit US  firms  to conduct a broader scope of activities in  Europe and 
elsewhere than in the US.  Both the EU and US lose as a result of this situation, in view 
of the  significant  contribution  EU  companies  make  to  the  liquidity  of US  capital 
markets and as significant providers of employment in the US. 
Financial services  negotiations  in  the framework  of the  GATS,  extended beyond the 
conclusion of Uruguay Round negotiations, were due to be concluded on 30 June 1995; 
However,  the  disappointing  decision  by  the  United  States  only  to  make  partial 
commitments  in  the context of the  extended GATS  negotiations - and to  take  broad 
MFN exemptions in respect of future business and activities - has reduced the value of 
the liberalisation package secured  in  these negotiations.  The European Community's 
suggestion to extend further the  deadline for  negotiations  to  28  July  1995  permitted 
nevertheless  the  conclusion,  without US  participation,  of a  fixed  term agreement on 
financial services within the GATS framework. 
3.6.2.  The new interstate banking framework 
The long-standing geographical segmentation of the US financial services industry was 
addressed by Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (the Riegle-
Neal Act).  The new provisions provide a framework  for the reduction  of barriers to 
interstate banking and is a very positive step.  However, the extent to which an interstate 
banking  network emerges  will  significantly depend on  individual  State participation, 
and the interpretation and  implementation of the new provisions by  the federal  bank 
regulatory agencies. 
Interstate banking will be possible through bank acquisitions, consolidation (or merger) 
and  de  novo branching on  a  non  discriminatory basis.  As  from  September  1995,  a 
foreign bank, like a US bank holding company, is able to expand interstate through the 
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acquisition of another bank, without regard to State law.  The regime for branching by 
consolidation and  merger is  different:  individual states can  "opt out" of the interstate 
provisions  by  enacting  legislation  to  that  effect  before  June  1997.  A  bank's 
establishment of de novo branches will only be permitted if a State "opts in",  i.e., by 
enacting specific legislation permitting out-of-state banks to establish branches. 
Although these changes are based on  the principles of non-discrimination, in  practice 
the ability to expand by acquisition of - or merger with - insured branches might be less 
advantageous to EU than US domestic banks because EU banks are for the most part in 
the (uninsured) wholesale market. 
3.6.3.  Non-national treatment for interstate banking 
Despite its many positive features for European banking firms, the Riegle-Neal Act has 
.not eliminated all of the non-national treatment provisions in this sector. 
Two particular cases remain: 
•  The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)  requires  (retail)  banks  insured  under 
the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  scheme  to  lend  a  certain  amount  of money  to  local 
community.  Wholesale banks have traditionally not been subject to this  requirement 
because  they  are  uninsured.  However,  with  the  Riegle-Neal  Act,  the  linkage  with 
deposit insurance has been broken.  Even if a foreign bank were to acquire an  insured 
US  bank and tum it into an  uninsured wholesale branch (which represents the bulk of 
EU presence in the US market), it remains subject to the CRA.  This is not the case for 
US-based, uninsured depository institutions under similar circumstances. 
•  The discriminatory imposition  of bank examination  fees  on  foreign  banks  by  the 
Federal Reserve Board remains of concern.  The Riegle-Neal bill imposes a three year 
moratorium on the imposition of fees for foreign banks by Federal Reserve Board. 
3.6.4.  Sectoral segmentation 
The  Glass-Steagall  Act  provides  for  the  separation  of commercial  and  investment 
banking  in  the  US.  Yet,  at  a  time  when  technology  and  other  innovations  are 
increasingly blurring distinctions between traditional financial services industries, it can 
be argued these provisions are standing in  the way of the rational development of the 
market. 
A second problem is the restriction on  banks affiliating themselves with other types of 
non-bank  financial  institutions  (notably  insurance operations)  enshrined  in  the  Bank 
Holding Company Act and  implementing  regulations.  These prohibitions  not only 
apply to all firms operating in the US market, but also to all non-US banking institutions 
which have operating subsidiaries in the US.  The practical consequence is that banks, 
insurance  companies  or  securities  firms  incorporated  in  the  EU  and  which  are 
legitimately affiliated among themselves within  the EU may  not operate in  the US  if 
those affiliations are not permitted under US law. 
Moreover,  when,  for  instance,  an  EU  bank  and  an  insurance  company  with  US 
subsidiaries  develop  formal  links,  they  may  find  themselves  obliged  to  divest 
themselves of one of their US  operations in  order to avoid 'non permissible' affiliation 
in the US. 
More and more EU firms are corning up against this problem when they consider their 
strategy for competing in  the EU internal market.  Due to  the greater flexibility in  the 
EU,  many EU banks, insurance companies and securities firms  are seeking links with 
each other, but face potentially damaging consequences for their US operations. 
3.6.5.  Other discriminatory practices 
Some  non-US  banks  operating  in  the  US  have  to  calculate  their  allowable  interest 
expense deduction  in  a way  which  disadvantages  them.  They are  subject to  a  30% 
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branch profit tax,  similar to a  withholding tax,  regardless of whether those earnings 
have been repatriated from the US.  They are also subject to a  tax dependent on the 
amount of the  bank's deduction  of its  interest expenses  (the  amount of the  excess 
interest tax), even if the bank has no taxable income.  Furthermore, in application of this 
tax, some non-US banks are disadvantaged in the use of certain tax exemptions. 
EU insurance firms face particular difficulties in the US as regulation and supervision 
of insurance activities is left to the States, and a separate licence is needed to operate in 
each  State.  Some States  only  issue  renewable  licenses  limited  in  time  for  non-US 
insurers, while other States impose special capital and deposit requirements, or other 
requirements,  for  the  authorisation  of  non-US  insurers.  However,  some  of these 
requirements are also imposed on out-of-state US insurance companies. 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 established, in  addition to a 4% excise tax  on 
casualty insurance or indemnity bonds issued by insurers, a special 1% excise tax on life 
insurance,  sickness  and  accident  policies  and  annuity  contracts  issued  by  foreign 
insurers;  it  also  established  a  special  1%  excise  tax  on  premiums  paid  for  certain 
reinsurance contracts. 
3.6.6.  GATS financial services negotiations 
Extended financial services negotiations in the GATS were concluded on 28 July 1995 
through adoption of a fixed term agreement, which will expire in December 1997.  Most 
major  trading  partners  were  willing  to  maintain  or  even  improve  their  earlier 
commitments  resulting  from Uruguay Round  negotiations,  as  well  as  not  to  seek a 
general  exemption  from  the  MFN  principle.  Thus,  this  deal  offers  important  non-
discriminatory market access opportunities, as well as national treatment guarantees, to 
foreign financial institutions. 
Even if it did not sign up to this agreement, the United States is a participant to  the 
benefits of it,  through its GATS membership.  This leads to  a situation in which the 
United States will entirely enjoy other Members' national treatment commitments and 
market access, while its own commitments remain extremely limited.  As for the former, 
it  only  guaranteed  non-discriminatory  operating  conditions  for  already  established 
foreign financial institutions.  The situation is  different with respect to market access 
commitments: the United States withdrew their previous more liberal offer and replaced 
it by a  new,  more limited schedule.  Consequently, as  regards the supply of services 
across a border as well as the establishment of a commercial presence through foreign 
financial  institutions,  no  commitment has  been  undertaken  in  the WTO  framework 
which would guarantee these activities in any financial services subsectors.  In addition, 
the United States took a broad MFN exemption for the purpose of reciprocity measures. 
Even if it repeatedly confirmed that it  has  intention of imposing new restrictions on 
foreign firms, the US will thus, in principle, be entitled to apply differential treatment to 
new market entrants, as well as to new activities of foreign suppliers.  It is to be hoped 
that at the end of the fixed-term Agreement the US  will  reconsider its  position  and 
withdraw its MFN exemption. 
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3.  7.  Professional services 
As  a result of the  conclusion  of the  GATS  negotiations,  the  access  of professional 
service  suppliers  to  the  US  should  have  been  improved:  a  number  of nationality 
conditions and in-state residence requirements should have been removed. 
However, the general problem still remains: licensing of professional service suppliers 
is regulated at State level and in  many instances there are no  specific rules regulating 
the access of foreign service suppliers (see 1994 Report for details).  In a sector such as 
professional services, which is by definition highly regulated and in which the exercise 
of the activity depends on  specific access conditions and qualifications, this remains a 
serious barrier. 
The  state  of play  in  this  sector reflects  the  implementation  of the  US  schedule  of 
commitments  in  the  framework  of the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations.  Despite  the 
improvements  contained  in  its  schedule,  access  to  the  US  market  for  professional 
services is not satisfactory.  Furthermore, regulations at State level are either not very 
transparent or lacking, and, in  the States which do permit access, the requirements are 
still very demanding. 
Nonetheless, the situation should improve steadily under the GATS/WTO: 
•  The Working Party on  professional  services  of the  WTO's Council  for Trade in 
Services will start reporting on the disciplines necessary to ensure that measures relating 
to  qualification  requirements  and  procedures,  technical  standards  and  licensing 
requirements in the field of professional services do not constitute unnecessary barriers 
to trade.  · 
•  Negotiations on the further liberalisation of professional services are expected in the 
framework of the GATS. 
•  The multilateral dispute-settlement procedure will apply to the professional services 
sector regardless of actual commitments in the schedules. 
45 1996 Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment 
G7 Conference 
WTO negotiations 
Radio 
communications 
Limited access to 
INTELSAT 
3.8.  The Information Society 
3.8.1.  Introduction 
The G-7 Governments agreed in February 1995 that the Information Society is  rapidly 
emerging as one of the key business sectors for the future.  The development of global 
markets  for  telecommunications  networks,  services  and  applications  are  central 
requirements for the achievement of the Global Information Society. 
US legislation presents considerable hurdles for non-US firms and foreign-owned firms 
wishing to  invest in radio telecommunications infrastructure and to provide mobile and 
satellite  services.  In  addition,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC) 
exercises a high degree of autonomy and discretion in regulating this sector, including 
reciprocity based licensing procedures for foreign-owned firms. 
Basic  telecommunications  services  is  one  of the  sectors. where  the  negotiations  are 
extended beyond the Uruguay Round.  Talks in a specially constituted WTO negotiating 
group on basic telecommunications concluded on 30 April with a decision to establish a 
new  deadline  for  agreement  on  15  February  1997.  Liberalisation  offers  currently 
submitted  will  remain  on  the  table  for  further  discussion.  The  EU  attaches  great 
importance to these negotiations, and is concerned to see that the current debate about 
telecommunications reform will not prevent the US from making comprehensive MFN 
commitments  on  market  access  and  national  treatment,  and  agreeing  to  the 
establishment of firm regulatory disciplines for the future.  The EU is  also concerned 
about the US  intention to exclude satellite facilities from the negotiations.  (As regards 
the public procurement aspects of telecommunications see chapter 2.4.3). 
3.8.2.  Investment restrictions 
There  are  various  restrictions  on  investment  in  the  US  telecommunications  market. 
These impede competition in  a number of sectors and slow down the development of 
new telecommunications infrastructure while raising costs for US service providers and 
service users. 
Section  310  of the  Communications  Act  of 1934  remains  basically  unchanged 
following adoption of Telecom Act of 1996.  It contains restrictions on foreign direct 
and indirect investment in  radio communications: No broadcast or common carriers or 
aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed radio station licence shall be granted to - or 
held by - foreign governments or their representatives, aliens, foreign corporations, or 
corporations of which more than 20% of the capital stock is owned or voted by an  alien 
(25% if the ownership is  indirect).  The one change  brought by Telecom Act of 1996 
was to eliminate the restriction on foreign directors and officers. 
Last  November,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  adopted  a  new  rule on 
foreign entry into the US  market, adding a new analysis to  the Commission's public 
interest  review  for  the  purpose  of granting  waivers  of Section  310  restrictions  on 
foreign  indirect  investment.  Specifically,  the  FCC  introduced  an  "Effective 
Competitive Opportunity Test" and other criteria, such as "the general significance of 
the proposed entry to the promotion of competition in the US communications market". 
The EU does  not  agree  with  FCC  contention  that  this  order sets  forth  a  clear  and 
explicit entry standard to replace its previous case-by-case determinations. 
To  provide  modem  telecommunications  services,  common  carriers  typically  need  to 
integrate  radio  transmission  stations,  satellite  earth  stations  and  in  some  cases, 
microwave  towers  into  their  networks.  Foreign-owned  US  common  carriers  face 
additional obstacles in obtaining the licensing of these various elements relative to US-
owned firms. 
Beyond its direct application, Section 310 also applies to the Communications Satellite 
Corporation (COMSAT), a private corporation created by the Communications Satellite 
Act of 1962 to enable the US  to  participate in  INTELSA  T.  In  addition, COMSA  T is 
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the sole US  access provider to  INTELSAT and INMARSA  T with  respect to  satellite 
services.  As  a  result,  non-US  incorporated  firms  face  difficulties  in  providing 
INTELSA  T space segment services to US  users and international service carriers, and 
INMARSA  T  international  maritime  and  aeronautical  satellite  telecommunications 
services. 
Finally,  the  Cable  Landing Act  provides  that  the  FCC  may  withhold  or  revoke 
submarine  cable  landing  licences  in  order  to  achieve  reciprocal  treatment  of US 
interests.  This  impedes  foreign  investment  in  this  particular  aspect  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure.  The  legislation  permits,  among  other things,  the 
revocation of an existing authorisation if a country fails to grant US nationals reciprocal 
rights. 
3.8.3.  Services 
The limitations on  services due to restrictions on owning radio licences was treated in 
the previous section, but there are a number of other restrictions on service providers: 
Equivalency tests  •  Under Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, carriers must make 
applications to the FCC to provide services.  The licensing conditions provide for public 
convenience and  necessity criteria.  In  the  case of foreign-owned  US  carriers,  and  a 
result of the adoption by the FCC of its November 1995 rule on  foreign carrier entry 
into the US  market, this now include an Effective Competitive Opportunities test with 
respect  to  both  the  provision  of  international . simple  resale  and  to  provision  of 
international facilities-based services.  The test requires an  assessment of whether the 
country of origin of a US affiliate provides competitive opportunities to US carriers for 
the services which the affiliate is seeking to offer. 
Radio station licences  •  Similarly, Section 308(c) of the Communications Act of 1934 permits the FCC 
Mobile satellite 
services 
to  "impose any  terms,  conditions  or restrictions"  on  the  granting  of a  radio  station 
licence  for  commercial  communications between  the  US  and  a  foreign  country.  In 
practice  licences  have  only  been  granted  when  foreign  partners  could  not  exercise 
effective control on the system's business and policy decisions. 
•  Section  309  of the  Communications  Act  requires  the  FCC  to  determine 
whether the granting of radio licences would be in  the public interest and permits the 
FCC to impose conditions. 
The  FCC  decision  to  give  American  Mobile  Satellite  Corporation  (AMSC)  the 
monopoly rights to serve the domestic US mobile satellite services (MSS) market means 
that any foreign competition is excluded.  The FCC has extended this monopoly to the 
domestic segment of international flights, although for the time being, FCC is  granting 
interim waivers allowing INMARSAT-based services. 
US justifications for  the  domestic  monopoly  of AMSC  - scarcity of spectrum and  a 
limited market - no  longer hold.  The FCC continues to license additional US  mobile 
satellite service providers.  Moreover, in the case of S-PCS systems, such licensing of 
providers  (coupled  to  the  implicit ownership filter)  seems to  indicate that the  US  is 
trying  to  seek effective control of global  MSS  ventures,  while  closing  the  domestic 
market  from  foreign  competitors.  The  seriousness  with  which  the  Commission 
considers these matters was conveyed to the US authorities in a demarche submitted on 
1 June 1994. 
3.8.4.  Data protection 
Individuals who are the subject of data processing operations are protected in almost all 
EU states by 'data protection' laws. 
EU firms  wishing to  transfer data to  the US  to make lise of data processing facilities 
there, or indeed wishing to sell personal information to US based firms, may encounter 
difficulties owing to the lack of legal protection for the data once it arrives in the US. 
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Some Member States'  laws  prohibit transfers to  countries  where  adequate protection 
cannot be provided and  a new  EU directive,  adopted  in  October 1995,  will  prohibit 
such transfers for the EU as a whole.  It is  hoped, however, that progress in  resolving 
this problem can be made during the coming year given the mutual commitment in  the 
EU-US Action Plan to address the matter, and the positive nature of discussions already 
underway in the context of the Information Society dialogue. 
3.8.5  Encryption 
An essential requirement for the development of electronic commerce is the availability 
of reliable encryption to ensure the confidentiality of commercial transactions. There is 
an  ongoing  debate  in  both  Europe  and  the  US  on  how  to  reconcile  the  privacy 
protection expected by individuals and commercial organisations with the requirements 
for  effective  legal  interception  sought by  the  national  security  and  law  enforcement 
services. 
At present, both the EU and the US operate an export control regime to limit the cross-
border  movement  of  the  strongest  encryption  products.  Moreover,  many  modern 
encryption  techniques are patented and  licences  may  be required  to  achieve  sales  of 
European  products  in  the  US.  Thus,  significant  barriers  to  international  trade  in 
encryption  products  have  been  created  leading,  in  turn,  to  the  slow  and  ineffective 
development  of electronic  commerce  and  related  applications  in  the  Information 
Society. This situation may not only threaten the European encryption product industry 
but will dramatically influence the development of a competitive European electronic 
commerce capability. 
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4. IMPACT OF THE NEW TRANSATLANTIC 
AGENDA 
The  NTA  commits  tJ:!e  EU  and  the  US  to  the  creating  of a  "New  Transatlantic 
Marketplace" by progressively reducing, or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of 
goods, services and capital across the Atlantic.  There is also a commitment to fostering 
an  active  and  vibrant  transatlantic  community  by  deepening  and  broadening 
commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties. 
4.1.  Mutual Recognition Agreement 
With agreement on a further round of widespread tariff cuts in the Uruguay Round, the 
trade policy agenda is increasingly focusing on non-tariff barriers.  Among these, some 
of the  major costs  faced  by  prospective exporters to the US  relate to certification of 
product conformity with a variety of US  requirements such as environmental and safety 
standards.  In  part,  this  is  due to  divergence in  standards,  but a major element is  the 
delay and the costs of certification by a body based on the other side of the Atlantic. 
A  Mutual  Recognition  Agreement  (MRA)  would  empower  EU  bodies  to  certify 
particular products for the US  market and to issue the relevant marks of conformity.  In 
return,  US  bodies  would  be  allowed  to  certify  conformity  with  EU  laws.  The 
Commission's  main  objective  is  mutual  recognition  of all  steps  of the  certification 
procedure which may have to be fulfilled for placing a product on the market, so as to 
obtain genuine market access.  A MRA would be  particularly valuable for small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The Commission is currently leading negotiations for MRAs 
with the US, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand 
Negotiations  with  the  US  began  in  1994  and  are  still  continuing.  Twelve areas  or 
sectors  are  currently  subject  to  debate:  telecommunications  terminal  equipment, 
electrical  products,  electromagnetic  compatibility,  pharmaceuticals,  medical  devices, 
machinery, lawn-mowers, personal protective equipment, pressure vessels, recreational 
craft, road safety equipment and airworthiness. 
One  of the  first  tasks  of the  negotiations  with  the  US  was  to  establish  a  solid 
understanding of each other's regulatory systems.  The second stage in  this process is 
now  to  create  a  degree  of confidence  in  their  implementation  and  enforcement;  a 
number of  joint EU-US workshops have already been and are currently being organised 
to  examine in  more detail these questions.  The US  administration has submitted new 
proposals, in certain sectors only, in early April 1996.  It is essential for the EU that the 
transition  periods  towards  full  certification  contained  in  these  proposals  are  simple, 
well-defined and short (two or three years maximum). 
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) Conference in Seville in November 1995 
called for full and complete MRAs in the field of medical devices, telecommunications 
terminal equipment,  information technology products, and  electrical equipment and  a 
common  transatlantic  registration  dossier  for  nf:w  drug  products.  Furthermore,  the 
TABD conclusions considered that talks on MRAs in additional product sectors may be 
envisaged, although unfortunately good manufacturing practice in  the pharmaceuticals 
sector was not included in the T  ABD proposals. 
The joint EU-US  Action  Plan  underlines  the  goal  of concluding  an  agreement  on 
mutual  recognition  of  conformity  assessment  (including  certification  and  testing 
procedures)  for  certain  sectors  as  soon  as  possible,  of continuing  ongoing  work  in 
several  sectors  and  identifying  others  for  further  work.  It  is  hoped  that these  latest 
commitments will encourage progress in the negotiations towards aMRA. 
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4.2.  Regulatory cooperation 
Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  implicitly  accept  that  standards  and  norms  differ 
between the EU and US.  While these differences may reflect alternative approaches to 
regulatory  issues,  rather  than  different  levels  of consumer,  health,  environmental  or 
other protection, they can also be the source of trade disputes. 
The products of technological development are to  be  welcomed,  but they  also place 
demands on  regulatory authorities.  Since public pressures are typically similar in  the 
EU and US, regulators on either side of the Atlantic face similar challenges.  Yet, in the 
absence of a positive commitment to cooperate, the chances are that regulatory solutions 
will diverge and, moreover, inadvertently provide the source of a trade dispute for some 
time in the future. 
The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement already contains an obligation to use 
international  standards  and  to  choose  regulatory  solutions  which  are  the  least  trade 
restrictive  possible.  This  agreement  provides  the  basic  multilateral  framework  for 
developing technical regulations and standards, but this is an area where the EU and US 
have scope to go further on a bilateral basis. 
There  is  a  fine  balance  between  protecting  legitimate  regulatory  interests,  while 
ensuring that trade interests are not excessively jeopardised.  Regulatory cooperation is 
therefore a voluntary and non-binding process, and it will not directly change existing 
regulatory processes.  However,  it  should play a role beyond that simply of an  early 
warning mechanism.  The aim is  to reach  more compatible regulations for the future. 
The initiative thus promises benefits for industry and regulators.  Compatible standards 
in  two of the  world's largest markets will reduce entry costs in  both directions.  For 
regulators, cooperation offers the possibility of learning from each other, and can help 
cover gaps in expertise where it is too costly to dedicate staff. 
Many  regulatory  agencies  have  already  established  close  transatlantic  contacts  to 
exchange information.  Some use this framework to consult on the development of new 
technical regulations and standards or in reviewing the adequacy of existing regulations 
(e.g. pesticides).  Regulators also actively participate in solving problems arising out of 
incompatible  regulatory  frameworks  or  in  creating  special  arrangements  to  bridge 
regulatory differences  (e.g.  slaughterhouse  standards).  Similarly  regulatory  agencies 
can cooperate in the enforcement of regulations (e.g. in the field of competition policy). 
In  the context of the Joint Action  Plan, the EU and the US  have decided to  provide 
strong political encouragement to respective regulatory agencies to enhance (or, where 
necessary establish) transatlantic cooperative relationships.  Such agencies are asked to 
look for ways to work with their counterparts to this end.  While the specific aspects of 
the cooperation will depend on  the sector concerned and the mandate of the agencies 
involved, cooperative efforts can take the form of:  cooperation on technical issues for 
regulatory projects of joint interest; greater use of each other's technical infrastructures; 
providing early warning of highly divergent or incompatible regulatory initiatives which 
may  have  trade  implications;  the  development  of  cooperative  procedures  in  the 
regulatory  process;  management  of  mutual  recognition  regimes  for  conformity 
assessment, testing and certification. 
The  Action  Plan  specifically  calls  for  collaboration  on  promoting  compatibility  of 
standards and of health- and safety-related measures.  Finally, although an early attempt 
to develop pilot cooperative projects became stalled in 1994, the Action Plan renews the 
invitation to pursue them. 
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4.3.  Customs Cooperation 
The EU and the US  have undertaken in  the NTA to  conclude by the end of 1996 an 
agreement which will cover both customs cooperation and mutual assistance. 
As far  as  customs  cooperation  is  concerned,  the  agreement  will  aim  at  simplifying 
customs  procedures,  at  improving  computerisation  including  data  exchange  and 
common access to databases, and at harmonising methods of work.  In  order to  assist 
the  realisation  of these  aims,  the  agreement  will  also  provide  for  an  exchange  of 
officials and cooperation within international organisations such as the World Customs 
Organisation.  Within  the  framework  of this  agreement,  both  parties  will  also  work 
together towards a common approach on the harmonisation of the rules of origin and on 
classification and valuation issues. 
The  mutual  assistance part of the  agreement  will provide for  increased  investigative 
cooperation in customs matters, an exchange of enforcement information, the protection 
of intellectual property rights and will cover commercial fraud, illicit nuclear traffic and 
trade in severely restricted chemicals.  · 
Formal negotiations on a customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement started 
in February 1996. Several meetings and an exchange of draft texts between EU and US 
representatives have already taken place. The Commission expects that an  agreement 
will be reached this year as foreseen in the NT  A. 
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4.4.  Science and technology 
Under the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda and  the  Joint EU-US  Action  Plan  both  sides 
undertook  to  negotiate  a  new  comprehensive  science  and  technology  cooperation 
agreement  by  1997,  based  on  the  principle  of mutual  interest  and  with  a  view  to 
achieving a balance of benefits for the two sides.  To that end exploratory discussions 
have taken place and the Commission is seeking a negotiating mandate from Council. 
This  agreement  would  address  such  issues  as  access  to  research  programmes  by 
researchers on both sides of the Atlantic and the related intellectual property issues. 
Moreover,  as  set  out  in  the  Joint  Action  Plan  work  will  continue  to  conclude  an 
Agreement on Intelligent Manufacturing Systems.  Both sides will also promote S &  T 
cooperation in support of other topics mentioned in the Joint Action Plan. 
In  addition, collaborative S &  T projects have been identified to address cross-border 
issues such as transportation, health and global climate change.  Finally, both sides have 
undertaken to renew the mandate of the EU-US Task Force on Biotechnology Research. 
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LIST OF FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS 
DoD 
EPA 
FCC 
FDA 
GATS 
GPA 
HR 
ISO 
MFN 
NTA 
OECD 
TRIPs 
USDA 
WTO 
Department of Defence 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Communications Commission 
Food and Drugs Administration 
General Agreements on Trade in Services 
Government Procurement Agreement 
House of Representatives 
International Standardisation Office 
Most favoured nation 
New Transatlantic Agenda 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rights 
US Department of Agriculture 
World Trade Organization 
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